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Abstract 
Since the “third wave” of democratization began in 1974, nearly 100 states have adopted democratic forms 
of government, including, of course, most of the former Soviet bloc nations. Policy-makers in the west have 
expressed the hope that this democratic wave will extend even further, to the Middle East and onward to 
China. But the durability of this new democratic age remains an open question. By some accounts, at least 
half of the world’s young democracies—often referred to in the academic literature as being 
“unconsolidated” or “fragile”—are still struggling to develop their political institutions, and several have 
reverted back to authoritarian rule. Among the countries in the early stages of democratic institution 
building are states vital to U.S. national security interests, including Afghanistan and Iraq.  
The ability of fledgling democracies to maintain popular support depends in part on the ability of their 
governments to deliver economic policies that meet with widespread approval. But what sorts of economic 
policies are these, and are they necessarily the same as the policies required for tackling difficult issues of 
economic stabilization and reform? Conversely, what sorts of economic policies are most likely to spark a 
backlash against young and fragile democratic regimes?  Do the leaders of young democracies face trade-
offs as they ponder their electoral and economic strategies?  
These are among the questions we explore in this paper, which provides an overview of the monograph we 
are currently writing on the economics of young democracies. We do so first by exploring the hypothesized 
relationships between democratic politics and economic policy, as well as the findings of several important 
empirical studies with respect to the economic performance of young democracies around the world.  We 
then provide some descriptive statistics on how the new democracies have fared in practice, making use of 
a new dataset that we have compiled (and which, among other things, is more up-to-date than most others 
cited herein). Do the data reveal any distinctive economic patterns with respect to democratic consolidation 
and reversal? We will show that they do. In particular, we find that deteriorating or stagnant economic 
performance constitutes a red flag or warning signal that the country is at risk of democratic reversal. 
Moreover, we find considerable variation in economic performance, suggesting that the design of political 
institutions in new democracies may have a significant influence on the probability of their survival. 
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The Economics of Young Democracies: Policies and Performance 
 
Introduction 
The second half of the twentieth century may eventually become known as the “age of 
democracy.” Since the “third wave” of democratization began in 1974, nearly 100 states have 
adopted democratic forms of government, including, of course, most of the former Soviet bloc 
nations (Huntington 1991). America policy-makers have expressed the hope that this democratic 
wave will extend even further, to the Middle East and onward, perhaps reaching China’s shores 
in the not-too-distant future (“Rice Plans to Encourage Democratization,” 11 October 2005, 
www.state.gov).  
Why do policy-makers care about advancing the cause of democracy? Beyond its 
contributions to civil liberties and international peace, democratic governance is increasingly 
seen as being necessary to the achievement of sustained economic development and a better 
standard of living (Bardhan 1999; Diamond 2005; Halperin, Siegle, and Weinstein 2005). 
According to Larry Diamond, “a high quality democracy…will be used to generate public goods 
that stimulate investment and commerce and raise the quality of life” (Diamond 2005). And in a 
recently published study, Halperin, Siegle and Weinstein claim that, “democracies generally 
experience more rapid and consistent improvements in the well being of their populations than 
do autocracies” (Halperin, Siegle and Weinstein 2005, 65).  
On the basis of such claims, these and other scholars have advanced the policy 
recommendation that democratization must play a central role, and perhaps the central role—in 
both domestic policies and foreign assistance programs that seek to promote sustained economic 
growth among other objectives. In fact, it appears as if policy-makers have heeded that advice, 
with Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice repeatedly emphasizing the need to promote 
democracy and only mentioning poverty relief in passing in her speech announcing the creation 
of a new Director of Foreign Assistance position in her Department (“Remarks At the U.S. 
Agency for International Development On Foreign Assistance,” 19 January 2006, 
www.state.gov).  Likewise, the new foreign aid program of the United States, the Millennium 
Challenge Account (MCA), provides funds only to those countries that “rule justly,” and it is 
plausible that the World Bank under the leadership of Paul Wolfowitz will also move in that 
direction, tying development assistance to democracy-building more directly. Understanding the 
relationship between democracy and development therefore goes well beyond an “academic 
exercise.” 
Despite the west’s political commitment to support democratization, the durability of the 
new democratic age remains an open question. By some accounts, at least half of the world’s 
youngest democracies—often referred to in the academic literature as being “unconsolidated” or 
“fragile”—are still struggling to develop their political institutions, and several have reverted 
back to authoritarian rule.  Among the countries in the early stages of democratic institution 
building are states vital to U.S. national security interests, including Afghanistan and Iraq. 
Ensuring that the developing world’s democracies survive and prosper is therefore a crucial 
policy challenge. 
The ability of fledgling democracies to maintain popular support depends, at least to 
some extent, on the ability of their governments to deliver economic policies that meet with 
widespread approval. But what sorts of economic policies are these, and are they necessarily the 
same as the policies required for tackling difficult issues of economic stabilization and reform? 
Conversely, what sorts of economic policies are most likely to spark a backlash against young 
and fragile democratic regimes?  Do the leaders of young democracies face trade-offs as they 
ponder their electoral and economic strategies?  
These are among the questions we explore in this paper, which aims to provide an 
overview of the monograph we are currently writing on the economics of young democracies. As 
already noted, we believe these issues assume significant policy relevance in light of recent U.S. 
(among other bilateral and multilateral) foreign aid initiatives explicitly aimed at promoting 
democratic consolidation. Evidence that economic performance significantly affects the 
probability of democratic survival in a given country renders the question of how well the new 
democracies manage their economies all the more pressing from a policy-making standpoint.  
Adam Przeworski and colleagues, for example, have found the probability that a young 
democracy will be overthrown grows ten-fold when the economy contracts two years in a row 
(Przeworski, et al., 2000:109). The idea that poor economic performance poses a threat to 
democracy has been supported by a great deal of quantitative work. In an oft-cited study, 
Rueschemyer, Stephens, and Stephens (1992) demonstrate that economic factors played a 
decisive role in nearly all the democratic reversals in Latin America between 1920 and 1980. 
Evidence from opinion surveys also shows that public support for democracy has frayed when 
economic conditions deteriorate (Haggard and Kaufman 1995).  
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This paper examines much of what we know about the theory and empirics of economic 
policy and performance in the consolidation and reversal of newly democratic states. The paper 
is in four sections. First, by way of background, we examine the hypothesized relationships 
between democratic politics and economic policy-making. Second, we analyze the findings of 
several important empirical studies with respect to the economic performance of young 
democracies around the world. In the third section, we provide some descriptive statistics which 
indicate how young democracies have fared and are faring in practice, making use of the new 
dataset that we have compiled (which, among other things, is more up-to-date than the others 
cited herein). We are particularly interested in comparing the economic performance of those 
young democracies that successfully consolidate as opposed to those that ultimately fail. Do the 
data reveal any distinctive economic patterns with respect to democratic consolidation and 
reversal? We will show that they do. In particular, we find that deteriorating or stagnant 
economic performance constitutes a red flag or warning signal that the country is at risk of 
democratic reversal. Moreover, we observe considerable variation in economic performance, 
suggesting that the design of political institutions in new democracies may have a significant 
influence on the probability of their survival. The fourth section provides our conclusions and 
policy recommendations, while a discussion of our dataset and some summary tables are found 
in the appendices. 
 
I. The Political Economy of Democracy 
In recent years a growing number of scholars and policy-makers have expressed 
optimism that democracy and development are mutually reinforcing. In the spring of 2005, for 
instance, Larry Diamond told an audience in Ghana, “Africa cannot develop without democracy” 
and asserted that the literature points “clearly” to “a causal effect of democracy on economic 
growth….” As a consequence, he urged his listeners to shun any thoughts of authoritarian 
solutions to their economic problems. He suggested that the East Asian miracle, for example, 
“took place in a historic and regional context that is unlikely to be repeated,” and that it therefore 
failed to provide a relevant developmental model for contemporary political leaders (Diamond 
2005). 
What are the channels through which democracy (our definition and list of country cases 
are found in the appendices) influences economic development? The literature posits several 
channels or pathways by which politics influences economics that we explore in this section:  
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First, democracy may influence economic policy through the channels provided by the 
electoral process; 
Second, that influence may be felt through the channels provided by political parties that 
serve to aggregate voter interests; 
Third, economic policy may be shaped through the channels provided by the institutional 
structure—e.g. presidential vs. parliamentary—that a particular democracy adopts; 
Fourth, the age of a democratic regime may influence economic performance, since 
democratic institutions may take time to develop and mature.   
Overall, these inter-locking attributes of a democracy—its electoral system (who gets to 
vote and which offices are contested), its political parties (how many, which interests are 
aggregated, and how well they are organized), its institutions (what type), and its age (how long 
these have been in place)—define its “constitutional political economy.” Indeed, we should 
emphasize that while many cross-country studies of democracy and economic performance 
define democracies at the most aggregate or abstract level, the variance among democracies 
along these four attributes may be of great significance for economic outcomes. In short, the type 
of democracy may matter no less than democracy itself in terms of delivering sustained 
economic growth.  
 
Voters, Elections and Economic Policy 
Competitive elections play a key role in all mature democracies, and central to 
democratic electoral theory is the presence of a median voter, or “swing voter” whose support is 
required if a politician is to be elected to office (Downs 1957). By definition, the median voter, 
who occupies the fifth and sixth income deciles, owns less capital than the average for the nation 
as a whole, or to put this in the starkest terms we might say that the median voter is poorer than 
the average voter. This fact is consequential for economic policy and performance, for it suggests 
that the median voter, whose political support is decisive in contested elections, will demand 
income redistribution from the rich from her representatives as the price of her support.  
Indeed, the demand for income redistribution is at the heart of contemporary political-
economy accounts of political regime change, specifically the shift from authoritarian to 
democratic regimes (Acemoglu and Robinson 2006). In Acemoglu and Robinson (2006), 
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democracy is modeled as a game-theoretic solution to interactions between rich and poor, in that 
it provides credible, limited redistribution to the poor through the franchise while preserving the 
property rights of the rich. One empirical problem with this argument, however, is that we do not 
observe such redistribution in practice, particularly in the world’s young democracies.  
Returning to the world of theory, scholars have argued that since the median voter has a 
powerful incentive to demand redistribution, those with wealth in a democracy will have less 
incentive to save and to invest, and they may even decide to take their capital to friendlier 
locales, leaving the country poorer. One frequently posited outcome of this interaction between 
rich and poor is that democracies inevitably emphasize short-run consumption at the expense of 
long-run investment, with the result that a country’s growth potential goes unfulfilled 
(Huntington 1968; Rao 1984). In short, the economic policies of democracies are redistributive 
toward the median voter and growth is negatively affected as a consequence. One might expect 
these pressures to be particularly acute in developing countries where the gap between the 
median voter and those in the upper income deciles in likely to be enormous, and where the 
median voter may even be lacking in some of the basic necessities of life. This is a claim made 
by Haggard and Kaufman (1995) for example, and we will return to it below in our discussion of 
age of democracy. 
The electoral influence on economic policy does not simply lead to income redistribution 
toward the median voter, but it has widespread macroeconomic effects as well. In the process of 
gaining the support of voters, politicians may be tempted loosen monetary policy and avoid 
fiscal discipline in order to provide infrastructure and jobs. From this perspective, a balanced 
budget is seen as a collective good, and no politician is motivated to contribute to it. Instead, she 
wants other politicians to practice fiscal restraint while she provides her own constituents with 
both “pork” and low taxes. Since every politician thinks in the same way, the result in a 
democracy is high spending and low taxation, and for this reason James Buchanan famously 
argued that democracies will tend toward the creation of budget deficits. Democratic 
governments inevitably become bloated, and it follows that “a democratic society…will tend to 
resort to an excessive use of deficit finance…” (Buchanan and Wagner 1978). 
The general tendency of democracies to adopt lax fiscal and monetary policies has been 
more precisely associated with the electoral process through the so-called “political business 
cycle” (PBC). Economists have long observed that democratically elected politicians have an 
incentive to stimulate the economy artificially by loosening monetary policy and abandoning 
fiscal rectitude during the run-up to elections, and this behavior has been formally modeled by 
opportunistic PBC theories (as opposed to partisan PBC theory, discussed in the next section)  
 5
Early theories of the opportunistic political business cycle focused on the opportunities 
arising from an exploitable Phillips curve and a myopic electorate (Alesina et al. 1997: 15), 
suggesting that competitive elections will generate volatility in employment, inflation, and 
growth rates.  Later work (for example, Rogoff 1990) made the questionable assumption of a 
myopic electorate unnecessary by positing asymmetric information regarding the incumbent’s 
competence. These rational opportunistic models note that while both competent and 
incompetent incumbents can stimulate the economy by stepping-up government spending and 
expanding the money supply, only the more capable policy-maker can bring about additional 
economic improvements using superior managerial skills.  Thus, the PBC allows competent 
incumbents to signal their abilities to voters. While the long-run effects of political business 
cycles on economic performance are unclear, they presumably undermine the level of investment 
and hence the growth rate by introducing greater volatility into the economy. It worth noting that 
PBC theories implicitly assume competitive elections, in which a degree of uncertainty exists 
regarding the outcome—a leader who will certainly be reelected has no reason to signal his 
managerial competence by stimulating the economy (Block 2002: 6).  By implication, a shift 
from a less democratic government to a more democratic government with greater contestation 
of public offices implies that political business cycles may be magnified in newly democratizing 
countries.   
Academic models that emphasize the influence of the median voter on economic policy 
have won a prized spot in the political economy pantheon. But empirical support for the median 
voter hypothesis is mixed at best, and it has been queried from a theoretical perspective as well, 
for various reasons. For one thing, since the interests of voters tend to be multi-peaked rather 
than single-peaked, their ability to hold politicians accountable on particular issues may be 
doubted. But even in the presence of single-peaked voting, voters may be unable to induce good 
behavior from their politicians, particularly if the official believes she is likely to lose the next 
election in any case, say due to exogenous shocks (e.g. an increase in oil prices) that undermine 
economic growth. 
More prominently, Olson famously questioned the ability of individuals to advance their 
material interests effectively, given the free-rider temptation in the face of collective goods 
provision (Olson 1965, 1982). For example, while the median voter might wish for income 
redistribution, she might not be bothered to go out and vote, assuming that others will perform 
that task and produce the desired outcome. Since individuals face severe organizational 
impediments due to their preference for free-riding, their political impact might not be very great 
after all as compared to that of organized interests. Olson suggested instead that small groups 
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with a shared purpose would be most successful in advancing their political and economic 
agenda to the extent they had a strong material interest in a particular policy outcome. And 
among these small, politically active interest groups, private sector business lobbies have won 
particular attention from scholars. 
The relationship between electorally motivated politicians and rent-seeking private sector 
lobbyists has been summarized in a simple equation by Grossman and Helpman (2002). They 
argue that:  
V = C + aW 
Where: 
V = votes, 
C = campaign contributions, and 
a = a parameter term that suggests the trade-off between C and aggregate welfare (W).  
 
Thus, politicians need to win votes but their campaigns are paid for by lobbyists who make 
contributions in return for desired policies (e.g. tariffs, contracts, or subsidies). By kowtowing 
too much to the lobbyists, however, the politicians generate welfare-reducing policies that cost 
them the votes of everyday citizens. They must therefore strike an appropriate balance between 
lobbyists and voters; still, the private sector interest will be both prominent in policy-making and 
generally welfare-reducing from an economic standpoint (Grossman and Helpman emphasize the 
formation of trade policy in their own work). 
Olson asserted that these lobbies can play an extremely negative role in the economic 
performance of nations; indeed, he assigned them a central role in the economic decline of 
democratic states (1982). For Olson, it was organized interest groups that prevented politicians 
from implementing welfare-enhancing reforms. Interestingly, whereas Olson tended to view 
interest group power as being weakest in young democracies, Hellman has demonstrated how 
organized groups effectively captured the reform process in post-Communist Russia, blocking 
those reforms that would have led to more openness and competition (Hellman 1998). This 
observation leads to a more general, empirical set of questions regarding how well organized 
special interest groups actually are in the world’s young democracies, how much influence they 
have over policy-making, and what economic policies they seek. This is an area in which much 
work remains to be done.   
In contrast to Olson, some theorists have tried to demonstrate that democracy ameliorates 
a society’s distributive conflicts and as a result this type of political system is efficiency-
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enhancing. Rodrik (1999; 2000), for example, elaborates a model in which two interest groups 
with divergent policy preferences repeatedly interact to formulate policy.  If the groups face 
uncertainty about which will have a superior bargaining position in the future, they can reach an 
equilibrium in which they compromise, since the costs of making concessions is offset by the 
future benefits of concessions by one’s opponent when that group is in power.  This outcome 
depends not only on repeated interactions, but also on uncertainty about the groups' future ability 
to impose their will on their opponent.  By introducing such uncertainty through competitive 
elections, democracy promotes compromise, reducing policy volatility and facilitating better 
economic performance. 
Competitive elections are also expected to be efficiency-enhancing for other reasons. For 
example, popular discourse, as well as economic theory, has generally viewed the public sector 
as less efficient than the private due to a dearth of competition in the former. However, 
democracy has the potential to introduce competition into the public sector, albeit indirectly.  
Lake and Baum (2001) lay out a theoretical model in which the government is a monopoly 
provider of public services, and thus restricts supply to drive up price in the form of rents 
extracted by government officials.  They view democracy as a way of rendering the market for 
public services "contestable," with candidates for political office being potential entrants 
threatening to undercut the monopoly provider.  In short, by introducing competitive pressures 
into the public sector, democracy forces the state to supply more and better public services.1
To summarize, one of the central characteristics of democracy is its reliance on 
competitive elections for choosing political leaders who are accountable to voters. That process 
has distinctive implications for economic policy, at least some of which have been held by 
scholars to be quite negative (Bardhan and Yang 2004). In the world’s young democracies, these 
negative attributes might even be accentuated as political leaders seek to shore up support and 
build credibility with voters (Keefer 2005). Yet it is not just through the median voter that the 
economic policies of democracies are shaped; these policies may also be a function of the way in 
which political parties and institutions aggregate contending interests. We turn to these 
perspectives in the following sections. 
 
                                                 
1 This argument, it will be observed, rings of the “fiscal federalism” literature which argues that federalist systems 
introduce competition into the public sector by allowing economic agents to “vote with their feet,” forcing local 
governors to restrain their personal rent-seeking and provide the public services that people actually want. However, 
questions may be raised about the economic benefits of political decentralization in those developing countries 
where government institutions are too weak to provide many of the public goods that citizens demand.  
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Political Parties and Economic Policy 
There is a longstanding tradition in the political economy literature linking the political 
party in power with distinctive approaches to economic policy; this has been called the 
“partisanship school” of political economy (for reviews, see Drazen 2001 and Rueda n.d.). 
Briefly, the partisanship school holds that left-wing or social democratic governments will 
protect the interests of labor and the “working class” while right-wing or conservative 
governments will protect the interests of those who have accumulated capital. The distinctive 
economic policy approaches are allegedly made manifest in macroeconomic performance, with 
social democracies having higher levels of taxation, government spending, and inflation than 
conservative governments. A related literature modeling partisan political business cycles views 
the different preferences of left- and right-wing parties for unemployment and inflation as 
producing macroeconomic fluctuations (Alesina et al. 1997: 45).   
As Rueda notes (n.d.), critical to such approaches is the assumption that political parties 
have “core constituencies” whose interests are paramount in setting the platform and in policy-
making should the party form a government. A party’s main challenge, therefore, is to build a 
“winning coalition” around this core constituency. On the other hand, if the party follows solely 
the preferences of its core it may well lose election after election (that, of course, could be a 
perverse outcome of internal party politics).  While the winning strategy of coalition-building 
may temper the more extreme strands of a given economic strategy the overall trajectory remains 
clear to voters, at least in contrast to that of the rival party. Thus, parties provide voters with 
clear choices. By “unpacking” political parties, this analysis of electoral politics allows for 
centrifugal forces within parties, which counteract the drive to appease the median voter, and 
endogenizes parties’ actual platforms. 
 It should further be emphasized that the partisanship approach is firmly materialistic, in 
that it associates core constituencies with economic classes. So far as we are aware, the 
partisanship school has not applied its model of party behavior to other constituencies, such as 
religious or ethnic groups. But such non-class-based allegiances are a distinctive feature of many 
new democracies, and these divisions may become the basis for competitive politics within the 
democratic setting. In Iraq, for example, political parties seem to be based largely on ethnic 
groupings, though of course within each ethnic faction one finds further political divisions that 
are also organized into parties. We note that the effects of these party groupings on economic 
policy and performance have been little studied; Haggard and Kaufman (1995), for example, rely 
on traditional, class-based partisanship models in their analysis of the political economy of 
democratic transitions. This is an area that will certainly attract more research from social 
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scientists in the years ahead and may lead to a very different view of the interests that political 
parties represent in domestic politics, and the policies they pursue once in government. 
Still other theorists have emphasized that the ideological orientation of the political party 
in power matters less than the level of institutionalization that characterizes the parties that 
compete for office.  In their study of the political economy of economic reform in 13 countries, 
Williamson and Haggard (1994) reject the idea that right-wing governments are better suited or 
even more likely to implement market-oriented reforms.  By contrast, they find that the 
governments are more likely to carry out economic reforms when the party in power enjoys a 
broad support base.  Similarly, Haggard and Kaufman stress the crucial importance of 
institutions that are capable of channeling conflicts over distribution and policy for the 
formulation of high-quality economic policy, and conclude that broad-based, cohesive political 
parties (or stable coalitions of parties) are particularly suited to perform this function. In contrast, 
they find that fragmented or polarized party systems generally fail to implement welfare-
enhancing economic policies (Haggard and Kaufman 1995).  We note that developing countries, 
including young democracies, vary enormously in terms of the degree of institutionalization of 
political parties and the relationship between party organizations and those who govern. One 
might say, in short, that what matters from an economic policy perspective is the capacity of 
parties to link politicians and large groups of voters in a way that enhances policy credibility.2 
And that observation, in turn, leads directly to our discussion of democratic institutions and 
economic policy. 
 
Democratic Institutions and Economic Policy 
Underlying electoral processes and party structures are the basic democratic institutions 
established by a nation’s constitution.  In discussing the implications of institutional structure for 
the formation of economic policies, analysts have emphasized the ways in which institutions can 
check the power of the state to prevent abuses, as well as examining how institutional structure 
influences policy outcomes.  A separate literature has suggested that more abstract democratic 
institutions—personal freedom, an unfettered press, etc.—generate a dynamism conducive to 
efficiency and economic development.   
                                                 
2 We thank Phil Keefer for emphasizing this point. 
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Numerous theorists have focused on the way in which democracy’s institutional features 
positively influence economic performance by putting in place checks and balances. One check 
results from the fact that incumbents (or their parties) can be held accountable by the public in 
the next election.  Whereas under autocracy, leaders may arbitrarily expropriate property for 
their own benefit, or government officials may demand bribes without fear of punishment, 
democracy generates incentives to refrain from such behavior, leading to stronger property 
rights, greater economic efficiency and less uncertainty (North 1990).  Rodrik (1999) builds a 
model that produces similar results.  
Moreover, the separation of powers present in most democracies introduces a further 
source of checks and balances.  Whereas voters can only hold politicians accountable ex post,3 
legislatures may block executive excesses ex ante.  Particularly relevant to a discussion of 
economic policy is the existence of unelected institutions designed to buffer certain sets of 
policies from immediate domestic political pressures.  Independent central banks, whose 
directors are often appointed for relatively long terms of office, insulate macroeconomic policy 
from potentially destabilizing popular demands.  Supreme courts, whose members may serve for 
life, serve—in theory—as a further bulwark against abuses by legislatures and executives.  
Analysis of institutions and their impact on economic policy have extensively explored 
the impact on policy of differences in the relationship between the fundamental bodies of 
executive and legislative authority. In particular, parliamentary democracies may be contrasted 
with presidential systems, in which the chief executive is elected by direct voting and given a 
more or less independent (from the legislature) power base and set of responsibilities. These 
differences could have important economic effects. Persson and Tabellini (2002) have pushed 
this analysis the farthest, developing a number of testable propositions that compare and contrast 
parliamentary and presidential regimes, viz.: 
(1) “Parliamentary regimes will have larger governments than presidential regimes.” 
(2) “Presidential regimes should be associated with less rent extraction and lower 
taxation than parliamentary regimes.” 
(3) “Presidential regimes…should also be associated with more targeted programs at the 
expense of broad spending programs” (Persson and Tabellini 2002, 30). 
                                                 
3 Notwithstanding recent instances of electorates unwilling to wait until the next election to unseat incumbents, as in 
Ecuador, Bolivia, Argentina, Thailand, and the Philippines.   
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 The rationale for this distinction between presidential and parliamentary regimes in terms 
of economic policy and performance in part stems from the different checks and balances they 
introduce.  Persson and Tabellini argue that political systems with “a larger concentration of 
power in parliamentary regimes makes it easier for politicians to collude with each other at the 
voters’ expense…” (Persson and Tabellini 2001, 4).  However, others argue that parliamentary 
regimes are best suited to check the abusive power of the president, especially in developing 
countries where legislatures are often weak.  As a consequence, developing countries have been 
urged to avoid strong, presidential models in favor of parliamentary democracy.  Parliamentary 
systems with coalition governments have been held to be the most growth-friendly, as the 
various factions keep check on each other’s extreme spending tendencies; they therefore 
“internalize” the benefits of the separation of powers model.  Overall, however, it is not clear 
which regime type—presidential or parliamentary—generates higher levels of long-run growth  
Beyond electoral processes and formal institutional structures, other theorists point to the 
role of more diffuse democratic institutions in promoting market efficiency by inducing the free 
flow of capital, labor, or information.  Early versions of this idea can be found in the work of 
Marx (Giddens 1971: 51), though it is most often associated with Hayek, Friedman (and Drucker 
in his 1939 End of Economic Man) and the Austrian School more generally.  More recently and 
formally, North (1990) has hypothesized that markets function most efficiently in democratic 
societies due to the personal freedom they allow. Similarly, Sen (1994) highlights the way in 
which the free transmission of information in democracies facilitates efficient outcomes.  This 
line of analysis, then, takes us beyond the formal constitutional political economy of democratic 
polities and reminds us of the importance of the many attributes associated with liberal 
democracy in particular, including civil liberties, a free press, and so forth, all of which may be 
in short supply in the young democracies of the developing world. 
Work showing a relationship between democracy and higher productivity provides 
empirical support to this hypothesis.  Przeworski el al. (2000) find that while dictatorships have 
higher rates of labor force growth, democracies exhibit more rapid total factor productivity 
growth.  Evidence of an association between democracy and higher productivity can also be 
found in Minier (1998), Krieckhaus (2005), and Rivera-Batiz (2002).  That democracies use 
existing factor endowments more efficiently would appear to support the idea that some of the 
more diffuse institutions of democracy serve to bolster economic performance.   
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Democracies Young and Old: Does Age Matter? 
Much of the literature relating democratic polities to economic policies and outcomes 
was written in the context of the advanced industrial states. But young democracies in the 
developing world initial conditions and political circumstances that could render these models 
less relevant.  Young democracies will by definition have less well-developed democratic 
structures: electoral processes, institutional mandates, and the composition of political parties 
may all be fluid and heavily contested in the period following democratization. Furthermore, 
young democracies may lack the traditions of a free press that informs voters with respect to the 
performance of their politicians, and the educational system may be weak, with entry—
especially to higher education—restricted to the elite.  Theoretical analysis as well as previous 
empirical work suggests that while democratization may provide some immediate benefits, some 
of its salutary impact on economic performance will be mitigated early on, as governments in 
such countries may have a particularly hard time formulating and executing consistent policies 
that provide the cornerstones for sustained growth.  
Analysis of economic management in young democracies has focused to a large extent on 
the effects of the uncertainty present in such circumstances.  Haggard and Kaufman stress that 
“uncertainties with respect to the stability of the new democratic order . . . affect the time 
horizons of both private and public actors,” leading politicians to pursue “policies aimed at 
managing opposition in the short run while discounting the gains from less popular reform 
measures” out of concern that political opponents will resort to non-democratic means (Haggard 
and Kaufman 1995, 152).  Keefer (2005) highlights another source of uncertainty: the fact that 
politicians and political parties in new democracies lack track records, and thus have difficulty 
making credible campaign promises.  This “credibility of commitment” problem fosters 
clientelism, as incumbents seek the support of any existing patron-client networks and target 
spending to benefit small groups, with which credibility is more easily built.  
Other theorists have noted the time needed to build democratic institutions beneficial to 
growth, and suggested that young democracies will consequently reap fewer economic rewards.  
As Papaioannou and Siourounis point out, the adherents of the Austrian school mentioned in the 
previous section cautioned, “the benefits of democracy will show themselves only in the long 
run, while its more immediate achievements may well be inferior.”  (Hayek quoted in 
Papaioannou and Siourounis 2004, 4).  In Rodrik’s (1999; 2000) model of social cooperation 
discussed above, democracy facilitates policy stability only after repeated interactions by groups 
with competing agendas.  This perspective implies an initial absence of norms of compromise, 
which may amplify the challenges arising because “new democratic governments face 
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exceptionally strong distributive pressures, both from groups re-entering the political arena after 
long periods of repression and from established interests demanding reassurance” (Haggard and 
Kaufman 1995, 152).  We would therefore expect policy-making in new democracies to be 
characterized by acrimonious debate and unwillingness to compromise, resulting in policy 
volatility and impaired economic performance.   
Surprisingly, relatively few studies have investigated the relationship between the age of 
democratic governments and economic performance.  This lacuna stems partly from the 
preference among analysts for pooling data and thus looking at cross-country differences and at 
the relationship between long periods of democracy and at averages of economic indicators over 
time (Papaioannou and Siourounis 2004). Consequently, this gap is being filled as time series 
analysis becomes widespread.  Although Przeworski et al. (2000) have a well-known finding that 
the older a democracy, the less likely it is to be reversed, he and his colleagues find that the age 
of democracy is not significantly related to economic performance.  
Two more recent studies have found that young democracies in fact perform as well or 
better than more mature regimes.  Controlling for other determinants of economic performance, 
Gasiorowski finds that average growth and inflation in young democracies do not differ 
significantly from “mature” democracies, no matter what threshold is used to separate these two 
groups (2000).4 Rodrik and Wacziarg (2004), on the other hand, find that a dummy variable for 
the first five years following democratic transition is significantly associated with higher 
economic growth and with lower variance in growth rates.5 Still another study suggests that 
states may experience slower growth in the first two years following democratization before 
seeing acceleration in growth (Papaioannou and Siourounis 2004).  The fact that the latter 
analysis looks only at countries that permanently democratized, however, limits its policy 
relevance, since many of the greatest economic challenges occur in countries that eventually fell 
back into dictatorship.   
Turning to other indicators of economic performance, Keefer finds that longer periods of 
uninterrupted democracy are associated with lower corruption, public investment, and public 
employment, as well as with higher provision of public goods ranging from the rule of law to 
                                                 
4 Gasiorowski (2000) employs a dataset of his own construction, which classifies 97 countries as democratic, semi-
democratic, or authoritarian in each year from independence through 1992.   
5 Rodrik and Wacziarg (2004) analyze data from 154 countries.  They look specifically at the average rate of GDP 
growth in the five years following democratization.   
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secondary education (2005).6  By contrast, Lake and Baum, running time series regressions, find 
that an increase in a given country's level of democracy results in a statistically significant and 
rapid jump in public service provision, measured by educational enrollment, life expectancy, and 
a host of other indicators (2001).  The different conclusions reached by these different studies 
demonstrate that how one asks questions about the economic performance of new democracies, 
as well as the methodology used to answer that question, affects the results obtained.   
Summary 
 As a political system, democracy has a number of distinctive attributes that have been 
posited by scholars to have important economic effects. By way of summary, we highlight the 
following hypotheses, some of which point us in contradictory directions: 
(1) Owing to the influence of the median voter, democracies are more likely to 
redistribute income than non-democracies. This, in turn, reduces the growth 
potential of these polities. 
(2) Political competition in democracies drives politicians to reduce taxes and increase 
expenditures; democracies thus tend toward budget deficits. 
(3) Elections generate incentives for politically motivated manipulation of economic 
policy, resulting in a political business cycle.   
(4) Owing to the inability of individual voters to organize effectively, public policy in 
democracies will be shaped powerfully by rent-seeking and welfare-reducing 
special interest groups. 
(5) Democracies will exhibit greater policy consistency, since repeated negotiations 
over policy facilitate compromise.   
(6) By introducing a modicum of competitive pressure into the monopolistic public 
sector, democracy will result in the provision of more and better public goods.   
                                                 
6  Rather than treating each country in each year as an observation, Keefer treats each episode of uninterrupted 
democracy as an observation and averages the values of the dependent variables over the episode.  He uses data 
from 1975 to 2000.  He classifies as democracies regimes with a top score on the Legislative and Executive Indices 
of Electoral Competition from the World Bank’s Database on Political Institutions. Indicators of corruption, 
bureaucratic quality, and the rule of law are from Political Risk Service’s International Country Risk Guide.   
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(7) In order to maintain the support of their core constituencies, political parties will 
adopt distinctive economic policies both in their platforms and when they achieve 
power. Left of center parties will favor the interests of labor; right of center parties 
those of capital.   
(8) The presence of broad-based, cohesive political parties is conducive to high-quality 
economic management, since these are better able to mediate distributional 
conflicts.   
(9) The separation of powers associated with democracy mitigates the potential for 
governmental abuse, since the different branches of government can check one 
another. 
(10) The economic policies and performance of democracies depends upon whether they 
have adopted presidential or parliamentary systems of governance. Parliamentary 
systems will tend to support larger governments than presidential systems, but may 
reduce the ability of executives to accumulate and abuse power.  
(11) The younger the democracy, the more unstable its economic policies and 
performance. 
In the following section, we explore these hypotheses through the lens of the particular public 
policies that democracies actually adopt. 
 
II. Economic Policy in Young Democracies 
While democracy may have a direct effect on GDP growth, most studies of the overall 
democracy and growth relationship envision the former as having various positive or negative 
impacts on the latter through a variety of different channels, including those highlighted in the 
previous section: electoral politics, interest groups, institutions, and the age of the regime. This 
list, however, is far from exhaustive.  Scholars have examined numerous other channels through 
which democracy affects growth (for in-depth discussions of this approach, see Tavares and 
Wacziarg 2001; Krieckhaus 2005; and Bourgignon and Verdier 2000).  The advantages of an 
analytical approach that focuses on the precise pathways by which democracy influences 
economic policy and performance are twofold.   
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First, examining specific channels through which democracy impacts growth avoids 
some of the methodological pitfalls associated with simply plugging a variable measuring 
democracy into a standard growth regression.  As Baum and Lake note, most studies adopting 
that approach do put forward some of the theoretical arguments regarding the democracy-growth 
relationship, but fail to account for the implied multi-colinearity in their econometric work 
(2003, 335).  They cite as an example the argument that democracy encourages growth by 
rendering property rights more secure.  This implies that measures of democracy will be 
correlated with investment—presumably another variable in the growth regression—since 
investors face less uncertainty about their returns.  Investigating the relationship between 
democracy and specific policies, which in turn impact growth, helps to avoid this 
misspecification and thus may offer clearer indications of a causal relationship between 
democracy and economic growth. Second, this methodology provides more concrete guidance to 
policy-makers, both in developing countries and in industrialized countries seeking to promote 
development through foreign aid and other policies.  Consequently, in this section we examine 
the specific economic policies that the leaders of young democracies seem to pursue through the 
lens provided by recent empirical research.  We find that this approach indeed produces more 
clear-cut findings.   
 
Fiscal Policy 
As already noted in the first section of this paper, it has long been held that 
democratically elected politicians will seek to minimize taxation while maximizing government 
spending, and that as a result democracies will tend toward budget deficits. But empirical 
research suggests that the relationship between democracy and fiscal policy is complex, with 
some studies finding that democratic governments do not differ in their fiscal policies from non-
democratic regimes, while others find that democracies, particularly younger democracies, do 
tend to have looser fiscal policies.   
In a pioneering study that compares and contrasts the economic policies of democracies 
and non-democracies, Mulligan, Gil, and Sala-i-Martin (2004) find no significant relationship 
between countries' level of democracy and their average education spending, social security 
spending, and corporate tax rates, although they do find that more democratic states tend to have 
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somewhat lower average government revenue than less democratic ones.7  Similarly, Satyanath 
and Subramanian (2004), find no robust relationship between levels of democracy and 
government consumption as a percent of GDP.8   
However, in their broader study of the channels by which democracy affects economic 
growth, Tavares and Wacziarg (2001) find that the level of democracy is associated with higher 
government spending9.  Similarly, Block (2002) finds that countries with competitive elections 
tend to exhibit higher current government expenditure than in countries without competitive 
elections.  Further complicating the picture, Keefer (2005) finds a significant negative 
relationship between the number of years of uninterrupted democracy in a country and the 
average public sector wage bill as well as public investment (both as a percentage of GDP) over 
the period.   
In fact, these results may not necessarily conflict with one another, due to the differences 
in the analytical techniques used and in the variables examined.  The results of Tavares and 
Wacziarg (2001) and Keefer (2005) appear most directly relevant to the study of new 
democracies, the former because their time series regression takes account of within-country 
variation, and the latter because Keefer employs the age of democracy as an independent 
variable in his cross country regression.  Thus, it would appear that young democracies may 
exhibit initial increases in public spending possibly followed by a longer-term decline.  
 
Monetary Policy 
Given its importance to economic well-being at both the macro- and micro-levels, few 
topics have attracted more research in political economy than the making of monetary policy 
(Drazen 2001). Monetary policy presents numerous puzzles for researchers, including the failure 
of some states to control inflation or to regulate the banking system and its money creation 
function. Further, researchers have been attracted to normative questions of institutional design: 
how does one enhance the credibility of commitment to monetary stabilization in those cases 
where policy-makers have a poor track record? In seeking to answer both these positive and 
                                                 
7 Mulligan, Gil, and Sala-i-Martin (2004) average the country's Polity IV score over the 30-year period to measure 
democracy.   
8 Satyanath and Subramanian (2004) employ the average of the Polity IV variable measuring the level of constraints 
on the executive to measure the level of democracy in a country during the period in question.     
9 Note that they use Freedom House ratings. 
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normative issues, political economists have explored a wide-range of variables that could 
influence the making of monetary policy, including the presence or absence of political business 
cycles and of democratic institutions that constrain (or not) financial profligacy. 
In their broad analysis of the relationship between macroeconomic stability and 
democracy, for example, Satyanath and Subramanian (2004) find that the average level of 
democracy in a country has a significant and substantial negative association with average 
money supply growth over the period 1960 to 1990.  Following the line of analysis put forward 
by Rodrik (2000), they attribute this relationship to the superior ability of democratic institutions 
to mediate distributive conflicts; indeed, more generally, democracy may be conceptualized as a 
technology for the peaceful resolution of distributive conflicts, which contributes to growth in 
myriad ways.   
More narrowly, in studying monetary policy in Africa, Guillaume and Stasavage (2005) 
similarly find that democratic institutions enhance the quality of monetary policy-making.  They 
note that monetary policy credibility depends crucially not simply on central bank independence, 
but on the extent of checks and balances in place to guarantee Central Bank independence.  
Formal structures such as constitutionally established vetoes can help to put such checks in 
place, but so can more informal institutions, such as multi-party democracy and the existence of 
coalition governments.  Thus, while they do not test the relationship between better democracy 
and monetary policy econometrically, the find that higher levels of democracy are one factor 
facilitating the development of a credible monetary policy.   
Although these studies do not directly address the conduct of monetary policy in new 
democracies, some suggestive implications can be drawn.  Both, for example, stress the 
importance of effective institutions; in the case of Satyanath and Subramanian (2004), these 
institutions mediate distributive conflicts, while in the case of Guillaume and Stasavage (2005) 
they check political actors seeking to manipulate policy.  Consequently, while democracy may 
facilitate better monetary policy over the medium and long term, new democracies with nascent 
institutions could be expected to experience difficulties controlling monetary management.  We 
explore this question in greater detail below as we explore other economic policies that 
democratic leaders might seek to manipulate for political reasons. 
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Exchange Rate Policy 
The choice of exchange rates has become one of the most difficult issues of economic 
policy facing governments in the post-Bretton Woods era. Faced with the “unholy Trinity” of 
trade-offs among competing economic objectives, nations must seemingly adopt the least of the 
evils and hope for the best. The near-continuous cycle of currency crises and exchange rate 
collapses since the 1970s suggests that the world’s economic managers are far from achieving a 
stable equilibrium. 
Why do states find it so difficult to commit to credible exchange rate policies? Willett 
(2004) suggests that any analysis of that question must focus on politics. In particular, he asserts 
that owing to conflicting political pressures—say between interest groups and the median 
voter—“governments will not always choose policy regimes that are ideal from the standpoint of 
generating economic efficiency and avoiding crisis…” Alesina and Wagner (2004) find 
empirical support for this proposition in their study of the relationship between broad measures 
of institutional quality and exchange rate policy. Specifically, they find that countries with poor 
institutions tend to attempt to peg their exchange rates, but then fail to maintain the peg. 
Nonetheless, more fine-grained analysis may help illuminate how political parties and 
institutions aggregate competing interests within the cockpit of electoral politics, and the 
exchange rate policies that are generated as a result. We are unaware of any empirical work that 
takes the sort of theoretical sketch provided by Willett and others and examines it on either a 
case study or cross-country basis.   
Instead, most research compares and contrasts “democracies” and “non-democracies” at 
the most abstract and aggregate level. Satyanath and Subramanian (2004), for example, use 
annual average changes in the nominal parallel market exchange rate as a broad measure of 
macroeconomic stability, noting that this variable reflects not only incorporates domestic factors 
such as inflation, but also external factors, such as problems with the balance of payments and 
debt.  They find that the level of democracy has a significant and robust negative association 
with exchange rate volatility, with much larger coefficients than other variables tested, including 
income inequality and openness to trade.  While Satyanath and Subramanian (2004) do not 
examine exchange rate policy specifically, Block et al. (2002) do attempt to determine whether 
political considerations impinge on exchange rate management.  They find evidence that 
devaluations are postponed in pre-election periods, presumably to avoid provoking public 
dissatisfaction by increasing the price of imports. 
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Tavares and Wacziarg (2001), in contrast, observe no significant relationship between the 
level of democracy in a country and the black market premium on the exchange rate,10 which 
they employ as a proxy variable to measure distortion economic policies more broadly.  
Consequently, while exchange rate volatility may be lower in democracies, it is not because their 
exchange rate policies are more or less distorted. Clearly, more nuanced research is needed to 
advance our understanding of the political economy of exchange rate management.   
 
Public Goods Provision 
If voters have any direct influence in democracy, one might expect it to be felt in the area 
of public goods provision. Normally, voters want the state to provide education, health care, a 
clean environment, infrastructure, and an ever-expanding list of goods and services. In a major 
survey linking democracy and public goods, Lake and Baum (2001) find that public goods 
provision is not only greater in democracies but is generally qualitatively superior to that in less 
democratic countries as well.  In cross sectional regressions, they find that higher levels of 
democracy are associated with better education, as measured by a host of indicators including 
literacy, primary school student-teacher ratios, and the level of enrollment at all grades, and with 
better health, as measured by life expectancy, mortality, vaccinations, and population per 
physician, as well as access to healthcare and clean water.11  Lake and Baum (2001) also run 
time series regressions and find that an increase in a given country's level of democracy results in 
a statistically significant and rapid jump in public service provision.   
These results are also supported by descriptive statistics included in Papaioannou and 
Siourounis (2004), indicating that democratization yields rapid increases in life expectancy and 
schooling.  Likewise, Tavares and Wacziarg (2001) find that higher levels of democracy are 
associated with higher average years of secondary schooling.  Keefer (2005) also finds that 
longer periods of uninterrupted democracy are characterized by higher average secondary school 
enrollment, further bolstering the claim that democracy is associated with better public service 
provision.   
That a positive relationship exists between democracy and the provision of public goods, 
specifically education and healthcare, appears straightforward.  Both cross country and time 
                                                 
10 The premium is defined as the difference between the black market rate and the official rate, divided by the 
official rate.   
11 Baum and Lake (2001) use the overall Polity III score to measure the level of democracy. 
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series analyses indicate that greater democracy is associated with more and better educational 
and health outcomes.  The evidence also suggests that even in new democracies, performance in 
this area tends to improve fairly rapidly. The posited theoretical reason for this apparently strong 
relationship is the demand of the median voter for such public goods, which of course are paid 
for by the polity at large. This could also be consistent with a broader political strategy of 
consolidating young democracies through the delivery of basic services, as well as the 
Aristotelian idea that since democracies rely on a cadre of educated citizens, they should be 
expected to invest in human capital. We note that while Persson and Tabellini posit that 
parliamentary regimes in particular should be relatively more effective at delivering public 
goods, we are unaware of any explicit comparisons of performance across different institutional 
structures in the context of the newly democratic states.  
 
Trade Policy 
Few public policies are more contested in democracies than foreign trade, and probably 
none have been subject to more research by political economists. With respect to developing 
countries, one of the major puzzles that has been examined in the literature is the shift to more 
liberal trade policies during the 1980s and 1990s, which seems surprising in view of the much-
touted abilities of protectionist interest groups to block policy changes. In their analysis of this 
puzzle, Milner and Kubota (2005) find that higher levels of democracy are associated with more 
liberal trade regimes, particularly in the newer, developing-world democracies.12  Their results 
are robust to the inclusion of variables measuring other factors frequently cited as causing trade 
liberalization, such as economic crisis and external pressure. The conclusion they draw follows 
Mayer (1984) and Rodrik (1998) in suggesting the importance of the median voter. Since the 
median voter in the developing world profits from intensive use of her labor, she may have a 
strong interest in increasing labor-intensive exports and capital-intensive imports. While this 
analysis is plausible, it must be emphasized that these authors do not empirically investigate 
whether or not the median voter does in fact benefit from trade liberalization. Indeed, evidence 
on this point is mixed. While Bourguignon and Morrison (1990) find that openness is associated 
with a reduction and inequality, Kapstein and Milanovic (2003) have shown that the median 
                                                 
12 Milner and Kubota (2005) measure democracy using the Polity IV score, and run time series cross-sectional 
regressions to test its relationship with openness, as measured by both the unweighted average tariff rate and the 
Sachs-Warner dummy variable.  They analyze a sample of 100 countries over the period 1970 to 1999.   
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voter in the poorest countries does not benefit economically from globalization, a finding that 
poses a puzzle for this line of analysis. 
Papaioannou and Siourounis include in their examination of the democracy-growth 
relationship descriptive statistics showing that "democratizations are followed by a substantial 
increase in international trade . . . " (2004: 10), indicating that the policy changes encountered by 
Milner and Kubota (2005) produce real increases in trade as a percentage of GDP. This finding is 
confirmed by Tavares and Wacziarg, who show that a greater degree of democracy is 
significantly associated with a greater trade-to-GDP ratio.  Other research encountering a 
positive relationship between democracy and trade liberalization includes Dethier et al.’s (1999) 
study of economic reform in post-Communist countries.  In a pooled OLS regression they find 
that countries' average scores on the Freedom House index are significantly associated with an 
index of liberalization that includes trade liberalization, domestic price liberalization, and 
privatization.   
The robust finding that more democratic governments tend to have more liberal trade 
policies suggests that young democracies are likely to liberalize trade with a resulting increase 
in their trade-to-GDP ratios.  However, the reasons for this shift in trade policy and performance 
have yet to be conclusively determined.  
 
Privatization 
Privatization of state-owned enterprises has also proved controversial, which is not 
surprising given that it generally means worker displacement and rising unemployment, as new 
owners of formerly state-owned enterprises seek to make organizational changes that will 
enhance efficiency. Does this mean that young democracies, which could be especially 
motivated to avoid increasing unemployment, are likely to put privatization decisions on hold? 
Surprisingly, that does not seem to be the case. 
In their study of 76 developing countries during the period 1987 to 1994, Biglaiser and 
Danis (2002) find that the presence of democracy has a substantial and significant positive 
association with the extent of privatization.13  Indeed, simple averages for each year in their 
                                                 
13 Biglaiser and Danis (2002) use the Polity IV score to construct a dummy variable that classifies countries as either 
democratic or non-democratic.  They measure the level of privatization in a country with a variable consisting of the 
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sample show that democracies privatized more than non-democracies in every year.  This 
relationship holds even when controlling for numerous other factors generally cited as partial 
determinants of privatization, such as the level of development, the fiscal deficit, and the current 
account position.  They explain their findings by noting that while proposals for privatization in 
democracies may be met with highly visible protests on the part of such affected groups as 
workers, within authoritarian regimes it is the executives at state-owned enterprises who will 
effectively exert pressure from behind closed doors to block privatization.  The association 
between democracy and privatization is supported by the above-mentioned study of post-
Communist countries by Dethier et al. (1999), which employs as a dependent variable an index 
that includes as one of its components privatization of state-owned enterprises.   
Further, as Kapstein and Milanovic (2003) have shown, in many new democracies 
privatization has been associated with the rise of social spending targeted at displaced workers. 
Rather than assisting the poor or those who are most vulnerable, political actors have sought to 
win support for privatization and globalization by providing side-payments in the form of 
unemployment insurance and pension reform, thus permitting them to make the transition to the 
new, private sector-oriented economies in which their skills may be in high demand. Thus, 
privatization and other economically disruptive policies may succeed particularly in those 
democratic settings where they are associated with more generous safety net provision. 
 
Institutional Quality 
Among their many attributes, democracies are often portrayed as less corrupt and 
administratively more efficient than non-democracies, and older democracies are posited to be 
better managed than younger democratic states. Keefer (2005) tests the relationship between the 
age of democracy and variables he sees as symptomatic of clientelistic behavior, and finds that 
longer periods of democracy are associated with lower corruption, higher bureaucratic quality, 
and the rule of law (as well as with higher secondary school enrollment and lower public sector 
spending, as mentioned above). Numerous other studies support the hypothesis that democracy is 
associated with lower corruption (Treisman 2000)14 and higher institutional quality (Rivera-Batiz 
                                                                                                                                                             
value of privatizations in a given year divided by the state-owned enterprises' share of GDP in the previous year 
multiplied by the current year’s GDP.   
14 Treisman (2000) uses Transparency International’s perceived corruption index to measure corruption.  He obtains 
like results employing the Freedom House rating and Przeworski et al.’s classification.   
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2002).15  Similarly, Rigobon and Rodrik (2004) find that democracy and the rule of law are 
mutually reinforcing.16   
While much of this literature finds that democracy improves institutional quality only 
after an extended period of time (Keefer 2005, Treisman 2000), other work has found its effect to 
be more immediate. In a study of economic performance in post-Communist countries, Beck and 
Laeven (2005) find that the level of democracy in 1992 is significantly and positively associated 
with the level institutional development in 1996.17  The theoretical analyses discussed in the 
previous section, which see democracy as checking abusive government and introducing 
competitive pressures into the public sector, provide some indication of the causal mechanisms 
behind these findings.  However, further exploration into how and when democratic government 
produces better institutions, if that is indeed the case, is need. 
 
The Political Business Cycle 
As discussed in Section I, political business cycle (PBC) theory makes the general claim 
that electoral schedules influence a country’s economic policies.  While the theory of political 
business cycles suggests that politicians will attempt to manipulate growth to further their 
chances of reelection, in practice their ability to do this may be severely limited, particularly in 
developing countries.  While increasing the rate of GDP growth with sufficient precision to 
affect the outcome of an election is a tall order for officials in even the most developed 
economies, the ability of governments in developing countries to do this is extremely limited due 
to relatively low levels of monetization, the small size of government expenditure to GDP, and 
greater vulnerability to external shocks (Schuknecht 1996; Brender and Drazen 2004).  It is thus 
unsurprising that no studies have found that PBCs in developing countries cause growth to 
change in the periods before or after elections.  For example, Schuknecht (1996) finds no 
association between election periods and changes in output growth.18 Similarly, in a study of 
                                                 
15 Rivera-Batiz (2002) studies this relationship using a sample of 115 countries and employing pooled OLS 
regression, averaging the variables' values over the period 1950 to 1990.  He measures democracy with the Freedom 
House index, and institutional quality using the index constructed by Hall and Jones (1999), which combines the 
Political Risk Service institutional quality index with the Sachs-Warner dichotomous measure of openness.   
16 Rigobon and Rodrik (2004) define democracy in terms of the Polity IV score.   
17 Beck and Laeven (2005) use the Polity IV score for constraints on the executive in 1992 as their measure of 
democracy.  They assess institutional quality using an index that includes corruption, the rule of law, regulatory 
quality, and government effectiveness, among other things 
18 Schuknecht (1996) examines a sample of 35 developing countries between 1970 and 1992. 
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African economies, Block el al. (2002) mention in passing that they find no association between 
multi-party or founding elections and growth.   
Other evidence suggests that this failure to impact aggregate economic performance is 
not for lack of trying.  Block (2002) finds that current expenditure picks up in election years, but 
only in countries holding competitive elections.19  Consequently, a shift from dictatorship to 
democracy implies the emergence of a political budget cycles.20  Whereas Block (2002) 
compares democratic and non-democratic regimes, Block et al. (2003) contrast new democracies 
with more established ones, and find that political budget cycles—manifested through increased 
public spending, net claims on government, and seignorage—are more pronounced under newer 
democratic governments.21  They find that these impacts are amplified when the election in 
question is a founding election, defined as the first competitive election after a period of non-
competitive or no elections.  Moreover, founding elections are associated with acceleration of the 
growth of the money supply (specifically M1).  They outline a number of reasons why PBCs 
might be more pronounced in new democracies.  Not only do incumbents who have not been 
competitively elected likely have more discretion to manipulate the economy, but such leaders 
have an incentive to fend off any challengers early in order to minimize future competition 
(Block et al. 2002: 9,12).   
The association between new democracies and political business cycles is confirmed by 
Brender and Drazen (2004), who find that political budget cycles are present only in new 
democracies.  In a sample of 68 democracies from 1960 to 2001, they find that if the sample is 
narrowed to exclude the first four elections following democratization, all traces of a political 
budget cycle disappear.  By contrast, election year dummies are significantly associated with 
higher deficits and greater expenditure during the first four elections following democratization.  
                                                 
19 Block examines a sample of 69 developing countries.  As independent variables, he selects indices of electoral 
competitiveness and democracy (both taken from the World Bank’s Database of Political Institutions) as well as a 
dummy variable for election years.  On the assumption that leaders facing reelection will boost current expenditure, 
which tends to more immediately benefit voters, Block employs current expenditure as a share of total central 
government expenditure as the dependent variable.   
20  Interestingly, whereas Keefer (2005) finds that the proportion of public spending devoted to investment will fall 
as democracies mature, Block (2002) finds evidence that electoral contestation is associated with a fall in public 
investment as a share of GDP.  These results are not necessarily contradictory, since investment as a share of the 
government budget may rise while falling as a percentage of GDP.  Nonetheless, their logic conflicts on a theoretical 
level:  Keefer views public investment as a prime avenue for clientelistic channeling of jobs and money to 
supporters, whereas Block sees current expenditure as the easiest way to direct public resources to supporters.   
21 Block et al. (2002) use a sample of 44 Sub-Saharan African countries for the period 1980 to 1995 and employ as 
independent variables an election-year dummy and a dummy for competitive elections.   
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Including separate dummy variables for the first, second, third, and fourth election following 
democratization shows that the significance of the election-year declines as the democracy ages.   
These studies of the political business cycle suggest that new democracies will undergo 
an increase in the variability of rates of inflation and money supply growth and in the level and 
composition of government spending.  In addition to the disruptions that these variations cause, 
they will also likely retard growth in the years after democratization.  Ramey and Ramey (1995: 
1148) note that volatility in monetary growth and fiscal policy— precisely the variables affected 
by the political business cycle—significantly lowers growth.  Exploring this relationship in 
detail, Aizenman and Marion (1999) find that volatility in these variables is associated with 
lower private investment, which presumably hampers growth.   
As noted in Section I above, the political business cycle may theoretically enhance 
economic efficiency, since it allows the electorate to select the most competent candidate, 
although this result depends on whether or not one assumes that politicians know whether or not 
they are competent (Persson and Tabellini 2000).22 To date, no one has found evidence of this 
theoretically possible “efficient PBC.” Consequently, the presence of political business cycles in 
new democracies, with the concomitantly higher volatility of monetary and fiscal variables and 
the resulting slower growth, suggests that new democracies may face particular challenges in 
the formulation of economic policy.   
 
Summary 
Just as democracies have distinctive political attributes, they also seem to generate some 
distinctive public policies. Further, the age of democracy seems to matter to economic policy-
making, with older democracies performing better than younger democracies across a range of 
measures. To highlight some of the major findings of the empirical literature, we note that: 
(1) Democracies, including young democracies, appear to provide more and better public 
services to their citizens. 
                                                 
22 In this model, if politicians think they are competent, then they will attempt to ramp up spending or stimulate the 
economy. By contrast, if a politician knows he is incompetent the costs of macroeconomic manipulation to him 
personally will outweigh the gains from trying to trick voters into believing he is competent. 
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(2) Democracies, including young democracies, are more open to trade than non-
democracies, perhaps due to the median voter’s influence. 
(3) Democracies, including young democracies, are more likely to privatize their state-
owned enterprises than non-democracies. 
(4) Democracies have better institutional quality than non-democracies, but older 
democracies fare better along this dimension than do young democracies. 
(5) Politicians in young democracies appear to make extensive use of the political 
business cycle, introducing macroeconomic volatility into the growth equation. 
In the following section, we examine the extent to which these findings are supported by our new 
data set, which is more up-to-date and includes more cases than most data sets used in the studies 
cited herein. 
 
III. Economic Performance of Young Democracies 
 In this section we provide an overview of the economic performance of young 
democracies since 1960. Overall, since 1960 we count 114 total episodes of democratization, 44 
of which were reversed at some point; among those that were reversed, several then later 
underwent second and even third democratization episodes, as indicated by Table 1 below (see 
Appendix 1 for precise definitions and methodology). Overall, nearly 38 percent of the 
democratizations that occurred between 1960 and 2003 eventually underwent reversals, ceasing 
to be democracies for some period of time.23  Cases in which countries underwent 
democratization for the first time in the post-1960 period had nearly the same rate of reversal 
(38.6 percent), as those undergoing democratization for the second time (41.7 percent). In 
contrast, only one of the six cases in which a country democratized for a third time was reversed, 
while in the single case in which a country underwent a fourth democratization, it was not 
reversed.   
                                                 
23 Some of the new democracies that were not totally reversed did undergo minor democratic reversals.  While we 
do not discuss such cases separately here, we will do so in our monograph.  For a more detailed discussion of this 
issue, see Appendix 1.   
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Table 1: Democratizations: 1960 - 2003
Sustained Reversed
Total 70 44
First Democratization 49 33
Second 15 10
Third 5 1
Fourth 1 0
Source: PolityIV, authors' calculations.   
 The question that we ask in this section is whether differences can be discerned among 
those that successfully democratize and those that undergo total reversals. We also wish to see if 
any regional differences can be found among the world’s young democracies in terms of their 
economic performance. Overall, our objective is to see whether the descriptive statistics yield 
any patterns that could be amenable to more precise testing. To this end, we examine the average 
economic performance of countries in each of the ten years following democratization. As we 
will see, we believe that some intriguing patterns do indeed emerge.  We leave aside issues of 
specific causality in this working paper, with the intention of addressing this question in our 
monograph.   
Before describing our findings, a brief discussion of our methodology is warranted.  Our 
unit of analysis is young democracies, and as mentioned above, some countries have undergone 
more than one democratization in the period under study.  We have counted each episode of 
democracy as a separate case.  The analysis in this section compares the average performance of 
cases in which democratization did not undergo a reversal to that of those in which it was 
ultimately reversed.  As is evident from a look at the underlying data included in Appendix 2, the 
size of the group of new democracies that eventually undergo reversals falls over time, as each 
year a few countries cease to be democracies.  Because we are interested in how new democratic 
governments manage the economy, it would not make sense to include years in which a 
country’s government was not democratic.24   
                                                 
24 This may at first glance generate concerns about attrition bias; however, this would only undermine our findings if 
the democracies undergoing reversals during the period in question exhibited better economic performance than 
those countries that remained democracies for the first ten years after democratization.  That various studies (most 
notably Przeworski et al. 2000) have found that the countries with low or negative growth are more likely to 
undergo reversals suggests that our findings are not driven by attrition bias.  Indeed, if only countries in which 
democracy endured for at least 10 years, but was eventually reversed, are included in the reversals group, the general 
relationships described continue to hold.   
 29
The example of Argentina provides an illustration of this methodology.  Argentina 
democratized twice during the period: once in 1973 and again in 1983.  These two episodes 
count in our dataset as two separate young democracies.  In the former case, democracy was 
overthrown in 1976.  As a consequence, Argentina from 1973 to 1975 is included in the 
subgroup of young democracies that are ultimately reversed, but drops out after the second year 
(i.e. 1973 is year zero, the year of democratization; 1974 is year one; 1975 is year two).  The 
episode of democracy in Argentina that began in 1983 is included in the subgroup of young 
democracies that were not reversed (with 1983 counting as year zero of democracy, 1984 as year 
one, and so on).   
 
Growth 
Contrasting the economic performance of successful new democracies with that of 
democratizations that were ultimately reversed reveals that growth in the former trends upwards, 
while the latter shows no clear trend, as Figure 1 demonstrates.  Because the initial difference in 
the average growth rates is statistically significant as are the differences in later years,25 it would 
appear that growth in unreversed democracies is on average lower in the years immediately 
following democratization, but overtakes that of reversed democracies around the seventh year 
after democratization.  This finding is particularly interesting in light of those theories discussed 
in Section I suggesting that democracy takes time to yield economic benefits (Haggard and 
Kaufman 1995; Keefer 2005, Rodrik 1999, 2000).  Young democracies that ultimately undergo 
total reversals may cut corners early on, avoiding some of the challenges of democratization but 
forgoing its later benefits.   
                                                 
25 The null hypothesis that the average growth rates for the two groups are equal can be rejected at the 5 percent 
level in 6 of the 11 years.  References to statistical significance in this section refer to t-tests of the difference 
between means of independent samples.   
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Figure 1: Economic Growth in New Democracies
% change in real GDP from previous year, mean
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Years After Democratization
Unreversed
Totally Reversed
 
Figure 2 suggests that rates of investment are also significantly higher in unreversed new 
democracies than in countries where democracy is overthrown, although in both cases it trends 
upward.  Moreover, the variance of investment falls steadily in unreversed new democracies, 
while exhibiting no clear trend in countries where democratization is ultimately reversed.  The 
literature focusing on the demands for redistribution unleashed by democracy (Acemoglu and 
Robinson 2006) casts this pattern in an interesting light.  Lower investment may signal 
misgivings on the part of those holding capital regarding the desirability of democracy, doubts 
that later translate into support for a return to authoritarianism.  In short, after an initial 
honeymoon period, it appears that investors in some democracies quickly become aware of the 
fragility or perhaps undesirability of their political system and investment levels stagnate. 
Figure 2: Investment in New Democracies
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Inflation 
Analysis of inflation in young democracies is complicated by a handful of cases that 
experienced periods of hyperinflation, with the annual change in consumer prices reaching into 
the thousands of percent.  In the interest of uncovering general trends, we here exclude rates of 
inflation more than five standard deviations above the average for each subgroup for each year.  
To cite the most extreme example, Peru in 1990 (ten years after democratization) recorded 
inflation of nearly 7500 percent.  As this is more than eight hundred standard deviations above 
the average for the “reversals” subgroup ten years after democratization, we exclude this value.26  
The trends discussed here are robust to changes in the rule used to exclude extreme values.   
Applying this methodology, consumer price inflation in unreversed new democracies is 
initially high, but trends downward, while inflation in new democracies undergoing reversals 
shows no clear trend, fluctuating around 15 percent throughout the period.  Average rates of 
inflation converge around the seventh year after democratization, as Figure 3 illustrates.  As 
would be expected, data on the average rate of money supply growth and the average change in 
the official exchange rate show very similar trends. 
Figure 3: Inflation in New Democracies
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These trends are broadly in line with the findings of Block et al. (2003) that democratization is 
associated with acceleration in the growth of the money supply, but that this slows again as 
democracy ages.  This pattern also lends also credence to the idea, discussed in Section I, that the 
                                                 
26  The instances of hyperinflation excluded are: Argentina (1984-5,88-91), Bolivia (1984-5), Brazil (1988-94), 
Nicaragua (1990-1), Peru (1988-90), Armenia (1994), Belarus (1993-4), Bulgaria (1997), Lithuania (1993), 
Romania (1993, 1997), and Ukraine (1993-5).   
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benefits of democracy take time to materialize, either because of the uncertainty present under a 
new political regime or because institution-building takes time.  Where these difficulties are 
confronted early on, economic performance may be initially inferior but later improve, while in 
cases where they are suppressed, the seeds for later democratic reversal may be planted.   
 
Government Spending 
Government spending as measured by public consumption as a percentage of GDP is 
initially about three percentage points higher in democracies that do not undergo total reversals 
than in those that do, a statistically significant difference.  However, while spending trends 
downward in the former, it rises in the latter, and the two converge roughly nine years after 
democratization, as can be seen in Figure 4.  That no political budget cycle is evident in this data 
is not surprising, since election schedules differ between the countries in the sample.   
Figure 4: Government Consumption 
in New Democracies
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These trends could be interpreted to mean that while the state in successful new democracies 
initially responds to demands for resources from the newly empowered population with relative 
largesse, it later grows more capable of managing such demands in a fiscally responsible manner. 
By contrast, governments in countries ultimately undergoing another reversal apparently become 
less able to assuage such demands, and become gradually more profligate.   
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Openness 
Figure 5 suggests that successful new democracies do on average exhibit greater openness to 
trade than new democracies that are later reversed, as measured by the ratio of imports plus 
exports over GDP, and once again, the difference is statistically significant, with the null 
hypothesis of equal average openness rejected in all 11 years.  Both groups show an upward 
trend in openness over the ten years following democratization.  This finding is in line with other 
work indicating that democracy facilitates trade liberalization as well as economic reform more 
broadly (for example, Milner and Kubota 2005).    
Figure 5: Openness in New Democracies
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Ethnic Divisions 
Numerous studies have found that a higher degree of ethnic fractionalization is associated 
with slower economic growth, higher corruption, and low institutional quality (Easterly, Ritzen, 
and Woolcock 2005; Alesina et al. 2002), suggesting that countries with an above-average 
degree of ethnic division may face particular difficulties when undergoing democratization.  Our 
data appear to support this proposition.  Table 2 suggests that while new democracies with lower 
levels of ethnic fractionalization on average have a significantly higher rate of economic growth 
during the first five years prior to democratization, the average growth rates of the two groups 
converge in the second five-year period after democratization.  This would appear to support 
theories that view democracy's ability to facilitate conflict resolution as salutary for growth.  
Interestingly, whereas growth rises with democratization in countries with below-average ethnic 
fractionalization, it falls with democratization in the more ethnically diverse countries, perhaps 
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due to the disruption caused by the airing of ethnic conflicts suppressed during periods of 
authoritarian rule.   
Table 2: Economic Growth in Young Democracies 
Before and After Democratization 
1-5yrs prior 1-5yrs after 6-10yrs after
Low EF 1.82 3.26 3.77
s.d. 4.01 4.34 3.06
(n) (28) (31) (27)
High EF 2.43 1.62 3.75
s.d. 3.03 5.95 2.39
(n) (47) (40) (30)
Source: WDI, Alesina et al. (2002), authors' calculations.
(5-year period averages)
 
Similarly, young democracies with a lower than average degree of ethnic 
fractionalization have average rates of investment that are 1-2 percent of GDP higher than those 
with relatively greater fractionalization.  Again, there is some trend towards convergence toward 
the end of the first ten years following democratization, although the differences between the 
average rates of investment are statistically significant at the 1 percent level in every year.  
Analysis of inflation data also lends support to the following hypothesis: that governments of 
states with higher than average levels of ethnic fractionalization have difficulty managing the 
economy in the years immediately following democratization, but to some extent master these 
difficulties over time.   
Thus, our data suggest that the level of ethnic fractionalization plays a role in determining 
how well young democracies are able to deal with the challenges of political development and 
economic management, with states characterized by a high degree of ethnic division having more 
difficulty managing the economy in the initial period following the transition from 
authoritarianism.   
 
Regional Variations 
Changes in key economic indicators in new democracies follow quite different 
trajectories in different regions, a finding in line with those of Krieckhaus's (2005) contention 
that democracy's economic impact varies by region. While we will not pursue here the reasons 
for this variation in detail—that topic will be fully developed in our monograph on the 
economics of young democracies—we might simply assert that we do not believe that these 
differences can be ascribed solely to such “initial conditions” as geography. As Steven Fish has 
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written, “polities undergoing regime change do not necessarily suffer under a tyranny of initial 
conditions. They make their own fates” (Fish 2001, 82). What this suggests is that democratic 
institutions and economic policy decisions also matter greatly, and that these are not merely a 
function of a region’s prior history. They are also a reflection of the ideas that leaders hold, the 
institutions—e.g. independent central banks—that they do or do not establish, the support they 
receive from foreign donors, and the possibility of anchoring their economies in a larger entity 
like the European Union. These hypotheses will be pursued in the monograph version of our 
work. For now, we will simply summarize the variation that we observe.  
In terms of growth, the performance of Eastern European countries differs significantly 
from that of other new democracies, with output contracting in the first three years after 
democratization and growth resuming four years after democratization, as is apparent from 
Figure 6.  This sharply different growth trajectory, presumably caused by the specific 
circumstances of the transition from communism, demonstrates the difficulty in drawing overall 
conclusions about the economic performance of young democracies and their survival or failure.   
Figure 6: Growth in New 
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Interestingly, average growth for new democracies in Sub-Saharan Africa generally 
matches and even outperforms that of the other countries in the sample, as Figure 7 illustrates.  
This result is likely a product of the strong performance of newly independent democracies in the 
region during the 1960s, a period of stronger growth worldwide.  Indeed, if cases classified as 
new democracies at independence are excluded from the African group, average growth falls by 
a percentage point or more. 
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Figure 7: Growth in New 
Sub-Saharan African Democracies
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Trends in inflation exhibit similar regional divergences.27  While new democracies in 
Latin America are plagued by high and volatile inflation, Eastern European nations faced high 
and variable inflation immediately after the transition to democracy, but this has since 
moderated.  By contrast, average inflation in Africa rarely exceeds 10 percent, as Figure 9 
demonstrates.  It is worth noting that Africa’s relatively low average inflation was not solely a 
result of 14 countries’ membership in the CFA Franc zone.  While new democracies in this 
monetary union do exhibit low inflation—under 10 percent on average, consumer price inflation 
in Sub-Saharan African countries outside of the CFA Franc Zone has averaged under 20 percent, 
well below the averages seen in Latin America and Eastern European countries in the early years 
of democracy.   
                                                 
27 Whereas we excluded cases of hyperinflation from the discussion of inflation above, in this subsection, we have 
included these episodes.  The fact hyperinflation occurred in two particular regions suggests it is an important part of 
the regional story, and should not be left out.   
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Figure 8: Inflation in New Democracies
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Once again, it would appear that the high inflation in new Eastern European democracies 
was a consequence of the transition from communism, which they were able to overcome during 
the first five years following democratization.  The Latin American countries' inability to reign in 
inflation on a consistent basis could be taken as evidence that the region's young democracies 
have failed to mediate between groups demanding resources, instead resorting to expansionary 
policies that have periodically produced hyperinflation.    
Regional differences are also apparent in public spending, with the four regions with 
substantial numbers of new democracies having fairly different levels, as is apparent from Figure 
9.  Few clear trends are apparent, although the persistent regional differences suggest one 
explanation for the lack of clear conclusions in the literature on public policy and democracy, 
since many such studies do not include regional dummies (for example, Rivera-Batiz 2002).   
Figure 9: Government Consumption
 in New Democracies
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 Summary  
This analysis bears out the implications drawn from broader literature on growth and 
democracy, in particular that new democracies that ultimately undergo reversals under-perform 
relative to their successful counterparts.  Although growth is initially lower in the sustained 
democratizers, it continually rises over time.  By contrast, countries in which democracy is 
ultimately reversed show a trend of stagnant or falling growth.  Similarly, new democracies that 
do not undergo reversals have higher inflation in the early years, but improve over time.  
Investment is also lower in democracies that experience reversals, as is trade openness.  
Government spending also trends upwards in countries where democratization is reversed and 
trends downward in successful democratizers. Overall, it would appear that establishing 
economic credibility early in the democratic mandate is a difficult task, but once such credibililty 
is gained, growth accelerates and inflation stabilizes. Where credibility is absent, these variables 
show no such positive trend. This suggests that discovering the deeper sources of economic 
policy credibility in young democracies should be a major target of research.   
This analysis also demonstrates the need for detailed regional case studies.  Growth and 
inflation evolve in markedly different ways in new democracies in different regions, while 
regional differences in public spending greatly overshadow changes in spending during the ten 
years following democratization.  Understanding the reasons behind this regional variation will 
be one of our major tasks in the monograph that we are also writing. 
 
IV. Conclusions and Policy Recommendations 
There are few greater policy challenges today than ensuring the success of the world’s 
many unconsolidated democracies. As we have seen, the economic performance of new 
democracies—and hence the chances of regime survival—has varied along a number of critical 
variables, including their ability to maintain investment levels, to control the money supply and 
budget deficits, and to open their economies to foreign trade. We have also seen that regional 
differences are significant, with Latin American democracies in particular experiencing the most 
volatility in terms of economic performance. Pursuing the sources of these differences is clearly 
a crucial task for research. 
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From a policy perspective, our work makes several points that we believe are relevant to 
public officials in both developing countries and the industrial world:  
First, the evidence suggests that leaders in young democracies often face trade-offs 
between their electoral and economic reform objectives. The tendency of leaders to exploit the 
political business cycle in the run-up to elections indicates that in some settings political 
competition may induce behavior that is inconsistent with the building of strong economic 
foundations for sustained growth. 
Second, the capacity of leaders in new democracies to pilot their economies varies a great 
deal across countries. This means that “one size fits all” policy solutions are unlikely to be 
appropriate where democratic consolidation is a fundamental medium-term objective, and that 
particular country circumstances must be taken into account as the two tracks of economic 
reform and democracy-building are pursued. 
Third, foreign aid donors must recognize the richness of the democratic experience 
around the world and the various forms that it takes. While some of the academic literature 
suggests, for example, that parliamentary regimes may be more growth-enhancing than 
presidential systems, that work hardly provides a conclusive basis for preferring one type of 
democracy over the other. Still, the potential costs and benefits of different electoral and 
institutional systems are worth full consideration as new democracies shape their constitutional 
political economy. 
Fourth, our analysis of the economic performance of new democracies strongly suggests 
that deteriorating or stagnant economic performance constitutes a red flag or warning signal that 
the country is at risk of political reversal. Poor economic performance—low growth, high 
inflation, etc.—during the first five years following a democratization is not necessarily cause for 
alarm.  However, if that performance does not pick up or deteriorates, democracy is at greater 
risk of being overthrown. Although the direction of causality remains to be settled—does failure 
to improve economic performance discredit the regime, or is such performance a symptom of 
weak institutions?—new democracies plagued by negative growth and high inflation, and which 
fail to undertake such necessary reforms as trade liberalization and privatization, merit the 
attention of foreign aid donors who seek to promote democratic consolidation. 
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APPENDICES 
Appendix 1.  Methodology 
Definition of Democracy 
Classifying governments as democratic or non-democratic, as well as identifying 
episodes of political change as democratizations is fraught with theoretical and practical pitfalls.  
For example, Milanovic (forthcoming) finds that when using the Polity IV index of democracy, 
which has a 20-point scale (“-10” to “+10”) that ranks regime from most authoritarian to most 
democratic, where the analyst draws the line (e.g. at “0” or at “+1”) between democracy and 
authoritarianism has a significant impact on the findings.  Our analysis attempts to avoid 
engaging with this particular issue by first identifying democratizations, and then classifying the 
regime prior to the democratization as undemocratic and the resulting regime as a new 
democracy.  Consequently, a more accurate term for the countries that we analyze might be 
"newly democratized" countries, rather than democracies.   
In building our democratization dataset, we have relied on the Polity IV dataset on 
political regime characteristics and transitions.  Although the aggregation of the various 
components of the Polity score has been characterized as problematic (Munck and Verkuilen 
2002), the extensive disaggregated data that the Polity project makes available led us to use this 
measure.  In our monograph, we will to examine the relationship of various aspects of 
democracy, notably the level of constraints on the executive, not assessed by, for example, the 
classification developed by Przeworski et al. (2000).  Consequently, we found the Polity data the 
most appropriate for our purposes.   
We define “democratizations” based on the "Major Democratic Transitions" in the Polity 
dataset (Marshall and Jaggers 2002).  Such transitions involve a six-point or greater increase 
(e.g. from “-3” to “+3”) in the overall Polity score over a period of three or fewer years, and we 
note this definition is also used by Rodrik and Wacziarg (2004) and Rigobon and Rodrik (2004), 
among others.  Whereas the Polity data takes pains to identify transition periods between regimes 
by using a special score, our analysis considers democratizations to have taken place only when 
the transitions have actually “finished” and led to a democratic regime.  For example, Polity 
views Mexico as undergoing a gradual democratic transition from 1994 to 1997, with each of 
those four years considered to have contained a “Major Democratic Transition.”  Our analysis 
classifies 1997 as the first year of the new democracy, since it was in that year the new, more 
democratic system was, at least according to Polity, fully in place. 
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We freely confess that, in theory, our methodology is problematic for at least two 
reasons, which fortunately do not arise in practice with the data.  First, our approach allows for 
the possibility of two successive democratizations with no intervening reversal or transition, 
which is theoretically problematic, since the academic literature on democratization generally 
conceptualizes it as an “event,” with subsequent increases in the quality of democracy 
characterized as steps toward consolidation.  As noted, this does not actually occur in the Polity 
data after 1950.28
A second and related issue stems from focusing on quantitative changes rather than 
qualitative levels to separate democracies from non-democracies.  In theory, a six-point “Major 
Democratic Transition” could bring a country from a higher to a lower authoritarian score 
(e.g. “-10” to “-4”), resulting in an undemocratic government being mistakenly classified as 
having become democratic. Again, this does not in fact occur in the data set, and all regime 
changes classified as democratizations in this study produced a positive Polity score. Four have a 
score of one (Sierra Leone 1968, Ethiopia 1995, Pakistan 1962, Cambodia 1993), eight have a 
score of two, seven with a score of three, nine with a score of four, and twelve with a score of 
five.   
In defining democracy, a methodological issue arises regarding the treatment of newly 
independent states.  Some of the most widely cited empirical studies of the effects of democracy 
on economic policy and performance did not incorporate data from the newly independent 
nations of the former Soviet bloc, leading scholars to question the robustness of the findings. For 
those studies produced since 1990, this is partly because no convention exists among scholars 
regarding the political regime classification of these states. Whereas Papaioannou and Siourounis 
(2004), Rodrik and Wacziarg (2004), and Przeworski et al (2000), for example, do not classify 
the collapse of the Soviet Union and subsequent independence of many states as a transition to 
democracy (in those cases where democratization occurred), Milanovic (forthcoming) does 
include these country cases in his set of democratizations.   
Presumably, one could investigate the system of government that prevailed in each newly 
independent country prior to independence, then judge whether independence marked a 
transition to democracy or the consolidation of already extant democratic institutions.  In this 
                                                 
28 It is worth noting that in three cases (Guatemala, Kenya, and Thailand), no total reversals occur between 
democratizations.  However, in these cases, a series of what Polity classifies as "negative regime change" (as 
opposed to a more serious "adverse regime transition") occur between episodes of democratization.  As mentioned 
above, we plan to address the issue of such minor reversals in our monograph, as these may erode democracy over 
time.   
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case, many of the former Soviet republics would be classified as new democracies because the 
USSR was clearly not a democracy. For the sake of completeness and consistency, not to 
mention simplicity, our study classifies all newly independent countries with positive Polity 
scores as new democracies.  This results in the inclusion of thirty-one additional new 
democracies, including twelve countries that were previously part of the Soviet Union, 
Yugoslavia, or Czechoslovakia.   
We classify countries as undergoing total reversals, i.e. ceasing to be democracies, when 
they experience what the Polity dataset terms an “adverse regime transition,” an anti-democratic 
“revolutionary transformation in the mode of governance” (Marshall and Jaggers 2002, 35).  
Since democracy may undergo gradual erosion as well as drastic overthrow, we also designate 
countries whose Polity scores fall from one year to the next as undergoing minor democratic 
reversals.  In this working paper, we do not examine separately the economic performance of 
countries that underwent minor reversals, although we will do so in our monograph.  Here, we 
include these in the group of sustained or unreversed young democracies, on the grounds that 
these governments retain democratic institutions despite setbacks in some areas.   
 
Democratization Data Set 
The methodology described above identifies 114 episodes of democratization during the 
period 1960 to 2003 (a list of these is included in Appendix 3).  As of 2003, fifty-four of these 
had not undergone any sort of reversal, sixteen had undergone minor reversals at some point in 
time, and forty-four had been completely reversed (see Table A1).  This sample is close to that 
employed by other analysts, for example Papaioannou and Siourounis (2004), who use their own 
more subjective criteria to identify sixty-seven permanent democratizations, but do not 
distinguish between those democracies that have undergone minor reversals and those that have 
maintained or improved their level of democracy.   
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Table A1: Democratizations: 1960 - 2003
By Outcome and Decade After
1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s 2000 Total
Democratizations: 22 18 16 50 8 114
Sustained: 4 6 13 39 8 70
No Reversal 2 3 8 34 7 54
Minor Reversal 2 3 5 5 1 16
Total Reversal 18 12 3 11 0 44
Source: Polity IV, author's calculations.  
Overall, twenty-four of the democratizations took place in Latin American countries, 
twenty-three were in Europe, forty-three in Sub-Saharan Africa, three in the Middle East and 
North Africa region, and twenty-one in Asia.  Table A2 suggests that the overall number of 
democratizations in each decade would appear to owe much to regional trends, with Sub-Saharan 
African countries, mainly those gaining independence, constituting a plurality of 
democratizations in the 1960s and 1970s.  By contrast, eleven of fifteen democratizations in the 
1980s took place in Latin America.  Democratizations in the 1990s are dominated by Eastern 
Europe and Sub-Saharan Africa. 
Table A2:  Democratizations: 1960 - 2003
By Region and Decade After
1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s 2000 Total
Total: 
Central America 2 1 4 4 0 11
South America 2 2 7 1 1 13
Western Europe 0 3 0 0 0 3
Eastern Europe 0 0 0 18 2 20
Sub-Saharan Africa 14 6 1 18 4 43
North Africa/Middle East 0 1 1 1 0 3
Asia 4 5 3 8 1 21
Source: Polity IV, author's calculations.  
While Sub-Saharan Africa has been the site of nearly twice as many democratizations as 
any other region, less than half of these have been sustained, with roughly 54 percent of African 
democratizations ending in total reversal (See Table A3).  Latin American and Asian 
democracies have also exhibited limited durability, with nearly 42 percent and 57 percent, 
respectively, undergoing some level of reversal.  By contrast, 80 percent of Eastern European 
democratizations had undergone no reversals of any kind as of 2003.  North Africa and the 
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Middle East have seen few democratizations, sustained or otherwise29 The sharply different rates 
of successful democratization in these six regions further suggest that initial conditions play a 
key role in determining how a country fares following democratization.   
Table A3: Democratizations: 1960 - 2003
By Outcome and Region
Latin Sub-Saharan N.Africa-
America W.Europe E.Europe Africa Middle East Asia
Democratizations: 24 3 20 43 3 21
Sustained: 17 3 18 20 2 10
No Reversal 10 3 16 15 1 9
Minor Reversal 7 0 2 5 1 1
Total Reversal 7 0 2 23 1 11
Source: Polity IV, author's calculations.  
Table A4 presents data on democratizations in countries with above and below average 
levels of ethnic fragmentation.  While 46.7 percent of democratizing countries with below-
average levels of ethnic fractionalization eventually underwent some level of reversal, 64.8 
percent of those with higher than average ethnic fractionalization experienced reversals.   
Table A4:
Democratization and Ethnic Fractionalization
1960 - 2003
Below Ave. Above Ave.
Total 45 68
Sustained 30 39
No Reversal 24 29
Minor Reversal 6 10
Total Reversal 15 29
Source: PolityIV, Alesina et al.(2002), authors' calculations.
Ethnic Fractionalization
 
This further supports the suggestion that countries with higher than average levels of ethnic 
fragmentation confront additional challenges when compared to those with less ethnic divisions.  
                                                 
29 Turkey has had one democratization totally reversed and another that was sustained, albeit with minor reversals, 
while reforms in Iran in the late 1990s resulted in its being qualified as a democratizer in 1997, a ranking that might 
lead some observers to question the entire Polity methodology. Iran earns a Polity score of three, a score applied to 
South Korea in the late 1960s and Malaysia since 1995.   
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More broadly, this data further emphasize the role that initial conditions play in determining how 
countries undergoing democratization fare.   
 
Additional Data Sources 
Economic data in this study are from the World Bank's World Development Indicators, 
which begins in 1960, in contrast to the Polity data, which begin in 1800.  Summary statistics on 
the performance of all young democracies with respect to seven measures of economic 
performance are included in the tables found in Appendix 2.   
This study also employs the measure of ethnic fractionalization developed by Alesina et 
al. (2002), due to its superior coverage of the universe of young democracies in the post-1960 
period as compared to the more common dataset used by, for example, Easterly and Levine 
(1997).  Using the latter dataset, data is available for only 77 of the 114 cases of democratization 
in our sample, as compared with all but one for the former.  Not only does the ethnic 
fragmentation data developed by Alesina, et al. (2002) cover more countries, but it also uses 
more recent sources to determine ethnic breakdowns.   
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 Appendix 2. Summary Statistical Tables 
All Cases 
Economic Performance of Young Democracies, 1960-2003
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
GDP Growth
Mean 1.9
10
1.3 2.5 2.8 3.5 3.7 4.5 3.6 3.6 5.2 4.0
Median 2.8 4.2 3.9 4.1 3.8 3.7 3.7 4.0 3.6 4.6 4.2
(s.d.) 7.3 10.3 6.8 7.8 6.0 5.8 6.3 5.1 5.1 4.7 5.
(n) 102 106 96 93 80 73 70 67 65 60 57
Investment (% of GDP)
Mean 18.2
4
18.2 19.4 19.7 20.3 20.6 20.9 21.1 21.1 21.7 21.4
Median 18.0 17.2 18.7 19.4 20.0 19.9 19.9 20.7 22.1 22.1 20.7
(s.d.) 8.1 8.2 8.3 8.8 8.4 8.1 8.0 7.5 6.8 6.8 6.6
(n) 94 96 88 86 74 68 67 64 62 59 5
Consumer Prices
7
1
Mean 125.6 79.6 130.2 271.0 50.8 70.5 70.9 84.1 57.4 105.7 146.6
Median 9.6 11.0 19.2 11.8 12.1 10.9 9.7 8.8 7.6 8.9 8.5
(s.d.) 857.3 333.9 555.0 1418.2 174.4 360.4 386.3 338.5 258.6 512.3 998.2
(n) 76 82 82 82 73 67 64 62 61 59 5
M2
6
1
Mean 126.1 58.6 150.7 142.9 48.2 51.9 67.7 64.2 75.9 77.2 138.2
Median 19.0 17.9 21.3 18.9 17.8 20.8 23.3 17.0 15.6 19.6 18.6
(s.d.) 846.4 178.7 668.7 773.3 154.2 163.8 280.0 235.6 364.3 294.2 850.5
(n) 82 90 86 85 75 69 67 65 63 59 5
ER Movement
6
2
Mean 89.9 74.5 50.8 216.9 35.8 54.7 89.1 57.4 53.0 75.6 133.2
Median 3.6 1.4 2.9 2.6 2.5 4.0 6.9 7.0 5.5 5.8 3.9
(s.d.) 503.2 321.9 171.2 1516.8 125.3 277.4 571.2 203.8 244.6 350.5 927.3
(n) 77 97 90 88 77 71 69 66 64 59 5
Government Consumption (% of GDP)
Mean 14.2
6
13.7 13.7 13.7 13.8 14.0 14.0 14.2 13.9 13.8 14.4
Median 12.7 13.0 13.2 12.9 12.8 12.8 13.8 13.5 12.7 12.0 12.9
(s.d.) 6.5 5.3 5.3 5.1 5.3 5.4 5.0 5.5 5.5 5.7 6.0
(n) 105 104 95 91 78 72 69 66 64 60 57
Trade (% of GDP)
Mean 59.8 65.3 68.8 69.1 69.5 70.7 72.2 75.3 76.0 80.6 82.6
Median 49.8 52.6 57.1 58.1 56.4 58.0 59.3 64.9 63.7 66.7 67.4
(s.d.) 37.7 41.1 40.1 39.7 39.3 40.8 40.7 39.7 40.4 42.6 42.7
(n) 104 104 94 90 76 72 69 66 64 60 57
Source: Polity IV, World Development Indicators, author's calculations.
1 Percent change from previous year
2 - = Appreciation. 
                                                       Years after Democratization                                                       
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 By Outcome 
Economic Performance of Successful Young Democracies, 1960-2003
(Those Experiencing No Major Reversal)
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
GDP Growth
Mean 1.0
10
0.2 2.4 2.4 4.2 4.1 4.5 3.7 3.9 5.7 4.0
Median 2.2 3.5 3.8 4.0 3.8 3.9 3.5 3.9 3.7 4.9 4.2
(s.d.) 7.2 10.8 7.2 8.4 4.9 6.1 6.6 5.4 4.9 4.1 5.2
(n) 68 68 65 64 60 56 55 53 52 51 4
Investment (% of GDP)
Mean 19.1
9
18.8 19.6 20.2 20.8 21.2 21.4 21.5 21.7 22.1 21.7
Median 19.3 17.7 18.8 19.1 20.1 20.3 21.0 21.2 22.7 22.9 21.0
(s.d.) 8.8 9.0 8.9 9.2 9.0 8.7 8.4 7.8 6.8 6.9 6.5
(n) 65 66 63 62 58 55 54 52 51 51 5
Consumer Prices
0
1
Mean 187.2 111.5 153.0 249.7 59.8 79.6 81.8 97.4 54.3 54.4 13.6
Median 12.0 12.7 18.7 12.9 13.5 12.4 9.4 8.9 10.9 8.9 8.6
(s.d.) 1066.4 408.7 642.3 1529.5 196.3 400.7 424.2 368.6 269.0 289.1 17.5
(n) 49 54 58 59 57 54 53 52 51 51 4
M2
9
1
Mean 190.9 79.9 97.9 182.5 54.4 56.6 78.8 75.3 78.6 47.8 26.0
Median 22.3 20.4 23.0 21.6 17.8 20.9 24.3 18.3 15.6 19.0 20.6
(s.d.) 1071.9 221.7 306.4 923.0 175.6 183.6 314.3 262.4 397.1 178.6 34.1
(n) 51 57 56 59 57 54 53 52 51 50 4
ER Movement
8
2
Mean 133.5 109.7 60.2 266.5 42.4 65.4 111.6 71.5 52.9 49.5 8.5
Median 6.9 6.2 4.0 3.0 3.3 4.9 7.0 9.0 5.9 9.2 3.5
(s.d.) 622.0 407.0 196.3 1813.1 143.7 316.6 645.1 227.9 259.4 265.8 17.5
(n) 50 58 58 59 57 54 54 52 51 50 4
Government Consumption (% of GDP)
Mean 15.3
8
14.5 14.4 14.4 14.3 14.5 14.3 14.3 14.1 13.8 14.4
Median 13.1 13.6 13.9 13.6 13.7 13.8 14.1 13.7 12.8 12.0 12.9
(s.d.) 7.3 5.6 5.7 5.3 5.6 5.8 5.4 5.5 5.9 5.9 5.9
(n) 66 66 63 62 59 56 55 53 52 52 5
Trade (% of GDP)
Mean 68.0
0
73.8 74.2 73.5 72.8 75.6 77.4 79.8 81.0 84.3 85.0
Median 59.7 63.0 63.1 62.2 57.4 58.7 59.7 65.5 68.7 68.5 71.4
(s.d.) 40.8 44.4 41.3 40.8 40.7 43.2 41.9 40.9 41.2 41.9 42.3
(n) 65 66 63 62 58 55 54 52 51 51 4
Source: Polity IV, World Development Indicators, author's calculations.
9
1 Percent change from previous year
2 - = Appreciation. 
                                                     Years after Democratization                                                      
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 Economic Performance of Failed Young Democracies, 1960-2003
(Those Undergoing a Major Reversal)
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
GDP Growth
Mean 3.6
10
3.1 2.6 3.6 1.4 2.5 4.2 3.2 2.5 2.6 3.9
Median 3.9 4.9 4.2 5.0 3.8 2.8 3.7 4.6 2.0 3.3 2.0
(s.d.) 7.2 9.0 5.9 6.5 8.2 4.2 4.8 4.0 6.1 6.8 6.7
(n) 34 38 31 29 20 17 15 14 13 9
Investment (% of GDP)
Mean 16.1
8
16.9 18.9 18.2 18.4 17.8 18.6 19.2 18.3 18.5 19.4
Median 14.9 15.9 17.3 19.5 19.1 18.2 18.1 18.3 17.4 16.9 16.1
(s.d.) 6.0 6.2 7.0 7.4 5.1 4.2 5.2 6.3 6.0 5.7 7.5
(n) 29 30 25 24 16 13 13 12 11 8
Consumer Prices
7
1
Mean 13.7 18.0 75.0 325.8 18.7 32.6 18.5 15.4 73.3 432.6 1077.3
Median 8.2 8.9 19.2 10.1 9.8 10.0 11.0 7.9 6.5 8.5 6.2
(s.d.) 18.9 25.0 240.5 1110.5 26.5 58.1 25.5 25.1 208.6 1198.5 2824.1
(n) 27 28 24 23 16 13 11 10 10 8
M2
7
1
Mean 19.5 22.0 249.2 53.1 28.5 34.7 25.5 20.2 64.2 240.5 811.5
Median 12.8 13.5 16.8 16.5 16.9 18.1 14.9 13.8 15.0 20.7 15.4
(s.d.) 19.4 23.3 1057.0 143.2 37.3 48.3 23.2 29.3 175.9 629.9 2252.0
(n) 31 33 30 26 18 15 14 13 12 9
ER Movement
8
2
Mean 9.2 22.1 33.6 115.8 17.0 20.7 8.2 4.9 53.4 220.8 881.2
Median 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.3 1.1 5.0 2.3 3.0 0.5 7.0
(s.d.) 25.0 93.2 113.1 568.9 38.1 55.2 9.2 7.0 184.0 655.8 2451.1
(n) 27 39 32 29 20 17 15 14 13 9
Government Consumption (% of GDP)
Mean 12.3
8
12.2 12.3 12.1 12.2 12.2 12.8 13.8 12.8 13.5 14.7
Median 11.4 11.0 12.3 11.0 11.2 11.7 11.8 11.3 12.0 11.8 12.0
(s.d.) 4.2 4.5 4.0 4.2 4.0 3.7 3.3 5.3 3.1 4.0 7.0
(n) 39 38 32 29 19 16 14 13 12 8
Trade (% of GDP)
Mean 46.1
7
50.6 58.0 59.4 58.9 54.8 53.1 58.3 56.5 59.5 68.0
Median 39.3 39.9 47.7 44.5 48.4 47.2 41.6 51.4 42.0 44.5 52.8
(s.d.) 27.1 29.7 35.9 36.1 33.0 26.8 29.8 30.8 31.4 42.6 44.8
(n) 39 38 31 28 18 17 15 14 13 9
Source: Polity IV, World Development Indicators, author's calculations.
8
1 Percent change from previous year
2 - = Appreciation. 
                                                     Years after Democratization                                                      
 
 49
  
By Region 
Economic Performance of Young Democracies, 1960-2003: Asia
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1
GDP Growth
Mean 3.8
0
4.8 5.8 4.7 5.0 3.7 4.3 5.0 4.9 5.1 2.8
Median 4.5 5.4 5.2 5.1 5.4 3.7 4.5 5.1 4.8 4.7 4.0
(s.d.) 7.1 4.4 2.0 7.9 2.4 3.4 5.7 2.5 3.0 3.9 5.4
(n) 18 19 15 15 13 12 12 12 12 11 1
Investment (% of GDP)
Mean 19.7
1
20.9 21.4 22.7 23.0 23.3 23.1 22.8 22.7 22.8 22.1
Median 17.4 19.9 19.2 21.2 20.0 21.5 22.5 21.7 22.1 23.4 23.1
(s.d.) 7.7 7.6 8.1 8.1 8.3 7.0 7.5 7.8 6.9 7.1 7.1
(n) 18 17 15 15 13 12 12 12 12 11 1
Consumer Prices
1
1
Mean 9.1 25.3 16.1 12.4 11.6 9.4 7.1 6.5 7.1 5.3 4.5
Median 7.5 6.5 10.2 9.7 8.3 7.2 7.5 5.7 6.1 4.7 3.8
(s.d.) 7.8 67.5 21.7 13.1 11.5 9.2 4.2 4.5 3.8 3.1 4.0
(n) 14 15 14 14 13 12 12 12 12 11 1
M2
1
1
Mean 16.1 28.9 26.3 22.9 21.4 22.0 15.8 15.9 13.3 18.0 16.5
Median 14.7 16.6 21.2 19.3 17.7 16.5 12.3 14.7 14.3 19.9 17.5
(s.d.) 6.7 51.8 19.0 14.5 15.2 19.0 16.6 11.7 7.2 6.8 12.1
(n) 16 17 15 15 13 12 12 12 12 11 1
ER Movement
1
2
Mean 28.7 46.2 7.4 3.6 3.4 7.1 7.0 3.9 7.0 4.7 15.0
Median 0.0 0.2 1.9 2.6 1.6 2.5 5.7 2.6 5.0 2.0 7.0
(s.d.) 89.8 169.8 12.5 6.1 7.7 14.1 8.6 8.2 11.8 6.8 26.3
(n) 16 18 15 15 13 12 12 12 12 11 1
Government Consumption (% of GDP)
Mean 11.1
1
10.7 11.2 10.8 11.2 11.4 11.8 11.8 12.4 12.6 12.7
Median 10.8 10.2 10.6 10.8 12.0 11.5 11.3 11.3 11.5 11.6 12.0
(s.d.) 4.1 4.2 4.3 3.5 3.1 3.0 3.6 3.6 4.2 4.7 4.8
(n) 18 18 15 15 13 12 12 12 12 11 1
Trade (% of GDP)
Mean 50.9
1
61.3 65.9 64.7 65.2 67.7 65.3 68.2 71.2 76.8 82.4
Median 44.8 51.9 58.1 58.3 55.9 56.4 56.7 61.4 58.0 65.4 79.5
(s.d.) 31.0 44.2 34.8 32.9 30.5 40.2 34.4 36.4 40.3 41.8 41.2
(n) 18 17 14 14 12 12 12 12 12 11 1
Source: Polity IV, World Development Indicators, author's calculations.
1
1 Percent change from previous year
2 - = Appreciation. 
                                             Years after Democratization                                              
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Economic Performance of Young Democracies, 1960-2003: Eastern Europe
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
GDP Growth
Mean -6.0
10
-11.1 -3.6 -1.8 2.6 2.3 3.9 2.2 2.1 4.0 4.3
Median -6.6 -9.0 -4.0 1.9 3.1 3.7 4.0 3.8 3.3 4.0 4.8
(s.d.) 6.8 16.1 9.5 10.5 5.5 6.6 5.7 5.0 3.4 2.5 3.4
(n) 20 20 20 20 16 16 15 15 15 15 1
Investment (% of GDP)
Mean 19.6
5
19.3 19.5 20.4 20.0 21.5 21.3 22.2 22.2 22.0 21.5
Median 19.9 18.3 18.7 19.1 20.5 20.4 21.4 22.2 23.2 23.5 20.9
(s.d.) 6.1 5.0 6.8 7.3 6.9 5.2 4.5 4.5 4.3 4.6 4.4
(n) 20 20 20 20 16 16 15 15 15 15 1
Consumer Prices
5
1
Mean 61.6 100.6 464.8 516.9 61.4 26.0 20.1 87.1 14.0 10.9 9.1
Median 26.4 39.8 36.9 35.9 21.9 22.0 10.6 8.0 7.3 4.1 7.8
(s.d.) 84.5 123.2 1220.1 1272.5 96.9 20.9 29.6 271.4 17.5 13.3 10.7
(n) 6 10 15 17 16 16 15 15 15 15 15
M21
Mean 31.7 84.4 279.0 111.6 40.7 23.5 36.4 41.8 21.5 23.4 22.9
Median 29.2 51.6 51.7 44.7 29.8 22.1 33.9 16.0 15.6 19.9 21.4
(s.d.) 4.8 103.0 543.4 211.1 42.7 19.2 28.4 89.4 13.4 13.5 11.7
(n) 5 10 13 17 15 16 15 15 15 15 15
ER Movement2
Mean 41.4 124.0 43.5 258.5 42.1 12.2 23.6 72.8 19.5 12.1 4.1
Median 13.8 23.5 3.3 3.2 8.2 5.5 15.3 8.9 5.0 9.6 3.2
(s.d.) 60.9 224.0 92.5 794.4 96.8 12.2 41.4 216.3 28.6 20.5 14.2
(n) 6 10 12 15 14 15 15 15 15 15 15
Government Consumption (% of GDP)
Mean 17.1 17.0 17.5 17.9 18.6 18.1 17.9 17.6 16.7 16.4 17.0
Median 17.8 17.5 18.5 19.2 19.8 19.6 19.4 19.4 19.3 19.0 19.0
(s.d.) 5.4 4.2 4.4 4.4 5.8 5.9 5.5 5.5 5.7 5.8 5.6
(n) 20 20 20 20 16 16 15 15 15 15 1
Trade (% of GDP)
Mean 76.9
5
92.9 98.1 97.3 90.8 92.0 97.6 101.1 100.0 106.7 109.1
Median 69.8 101.5 100.8 97.1 93.8 92.4 105.4 109.2 98.2 110.7 109.3
(s.d.) 30.0 37.2 35.1 35.9 30.4 30.8 32.1 33.4 33.6 35.2 35.2
(n) 19 20 20 20 16 16 15 15 15 15 1
Source: Polity IV, World Development Indicators, author's calculations.
5
1 Percent change from previous year
2 - = Appreciation. 
                                               Years after Democratization                                               
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Economic Performance of Young Democracies, 1960-2003: Latin America
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
GDP Growth
Mean 3.2
10
3.9 3.6 2.3 2.9 2.8 3.0 3.5 3.7 4.9 2.4
Median 2.6 4.4 3.8 3.3 3.1 3.1 3.2 3.8 4.0 5.9 2.2
(s.d.) 5.0 3.6 4.0 6.0 2.8 2.9 4.4 2.9 4.8 5.3 3.2
(n) 24 23 22 20 19 18 18 17 17 17 1
Investment (% of GDP)
Mean 17.4
7
18.7 20.2 19.4 19.3 18.2 18.8 19.1 20.4 21.0 21.2
Median 17.4 18.2 20.6 19.8 20.1 18.2 18.1 18.7 20.5 20.6 20.5
(s.d.) 7.9 7.5 5.5 5.3 5.4 5.1 4.8 4.2 4.9 5.5 5.7
(n) 23 22 21 19 18 17 17 16 16 16 1
Consumer Prices
7
1
Mean 390.2 207.5 134.4 673.7 123.1 219.0 225.8 224.3 185.7 358.9 487.6
Median 21.0 22.3 21.2 15.4 15.5 14.6 13.4 14.1 14.8 16.0 10.9
(s.d.) 1586.9 643.3 310.4 2685.9 333.6 708.6 742.7 603.9 493.0 959.4 1865.2
(n) 22 21 20 19 18 17 17 16 16 16 1
M2
6
1
Mean 384.7 138.6 115.2 446.4 112.3 131.7 180.1 178.4 231.5 207.8 396.8
Median 28.6 27.1 19.3 24.7 19.4 20.9 24.4 18.9 18.4 18.8 22.4
(s.d.) 1556.9 332.8 310.0 1570.5 298.5 310.9 533.3 442.1 691.6 535.8 1543.2
(n) 24 23 22 20 19 18 18 17 17 17 1
ER Movement
7
2
Mean 236.3 175.4 143.0 739.9 91.4 165.1 301.0 142.6 164.8 236.7 419.7
Median 4.2 1.4 8.4 3.4 0.7 3.7 5.3 12.0 5.7 9.8 7.4
(s.d.) 911.6 612.9 323.4 3107.7 230.3 542.1 1113.0 338.1 465.1 637.1 1682.1
(n) 23 23 22 20 19 18 18 17 17 17 1
Government Consumption (% of GDP)
Mean 13.2
7
12.1 12.3 12.3 11.1 11.9 11.8 11.8 11.7 11.8 12.8
Median 10.8 10.5 12.6 12.2 10.1 12.1 11.7 11.3 11.1 11.0 11.5
(s.d.) 7.8 4.1 3.6 3.7 3.6 4.4 4.3 5.3 5.2 5.7 6.6
(n) 23 22 21 19 19 18 18 17 17 17 1
Trade (% of GDP)
Mean 60.6
7
62.0 61.9 63.9 63.4 64.8 68.2 67.1 70.7 70.7 69.2
Median 48.0 47.6 47.9 45.5 47.1 46.1 52.8 48.4 57.7 58.2 55.2
(s.d.) 56.1 53.5 51.7 52.7 53.3 54.5 53.6 50.0 51.9 51.6 49.3
(n) 24 23 22 20 19 18 18 17 17 17 1
Source: Polity IV, World Development Indicators, author's calculations.
7
1 Percent change from previous year
2 - = Appreciation. 
                                               Years after Democratization                                               
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Economic Performance of Young Democracies, 1960-2003:  Sub-Saharan Africa
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
GDP Growth
Mean 3.6
10
3.3 3.2 3.7 2.7 4.9 6.3 3.2 3.7 6.2 5.1
Median 2.9 3.8 4.0 3.0 3.8 4.7 3.9 2.3 3.2 5.8 5.0
(s.d.) 5.6 6.0 5.2 5.5 8.2 7.1 7.9 6.6 6.4 4.5 7.4
(n) 34 38 33 32 26 21 19 19 17 13 1
Investment (% of GDP)
Mean 16.9
0
15.9 17.8 17.4 19.1 19.6 20.8 21.0 20.1 22.6 22.1
Median 13.6 13.2 15.8 15.2 17.2 16.6 18.0 17.0 17.5 21.8 19.0
(s.d.) 9.7 10.0 10.8 11.3 10.5 11.5 11.5 10.4 8.9 8.9 8.7
(n) 27 31 26 26 21 17 17 17 15 13 1
Consumer Prices
0
1
Mean 12.6 21.3 23.9 13.4 11.7 17.2 8.5 8.6 8.0 11.8 11.2
Median 4.1 8.2 12.0 8.5 6.8 4.3 6.2 8.1 6.2 9.2 9.
(s.d.) 23.1 37.3 35.7 16.9 12.1 38.9 11.4 7.1 9.0 8.7 7.1
(n) 29 31 28 27 21 17 15 16 15 14 1
M2
0
1
1
Mean 18.5 18.1 196.9 31.2 20.0 23.2 22.4 14.3 16.5 28.1 36.7
Median 10.7 12.4 13.3 15.1 15.2 20.8 14.8 15.9 17.2 19.0 13.6
(s.d.) 19.8 30.4 1013.5 72.3 26.6 28.6 22.4 14.8 13.4 32.9 65.9
(n) 33 36 32 30 24 19 18 19 17 14 1
ER Movement
1
2
Mean 26.2 24.9 20.1 9.2 12.8 10.6 8.3 9.0 6.8 7.9 1.1
Median 4.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 2.5 2.0 6.3 5.0 5.3 1.7 3.0
(s.d.) 65.6 92.7 40.0 23.6 31.4 21.7 8.8 12.7 10.7 11.6 13.0
(n) 28 42 37 34 27 22 20 20 18 14 1
Government Consumption (% of GDP)
Mean 14.9
1
14.4 13.7 13.3 14.4 14.6 15.1 15.5 14.9 14.9 16.2
Median 13.3 13.3 12.9 12.9 14.2 13.1 14.6 15.9 14.1 14.9 16.0
(s.d.) 6.9 6.2 6.3 5.7 5.3 5.8 5.0 5.5 5.9 5.9 6.3
(n) 38 38 33 31 24 20 18 18 16 13 1
Trade (% of GDP)
Mean 58.6
0
58.7 61.9 61.5 68.8 67.8 68.2 70.8 68.2 74.3 77.1
Median 49.3 52.8 53.0 57.3 56.8 59.4 59.7 64.6 63.8 65.1 63.9
(s.d.) 28.5 28.3 30.0 28.5 33.7 32.9 32.4 31.2 28.5 32.2 32.7
(n) 38 39 33 31 24 21 19 19 17 14 1
Source: Polity IV, World Development Indicators, author's calculations.
1
1 Percent change from previous year
2 - = Appreciation. 
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Appendix 3.  List of Democratizations 
(country and year of democratization) 
 
Albania 1992 
Argentina 1973 
Argentina 1983 
Armenia 1991 
Armenia 1998 
Bangladesh 1972 
Bangladesh 1991 
Belarus 1991 
Benin 1960 
Benin 1991 
Bolivia 1982 
Botswana 1966 
Brazil 1985 
Bulgaria 1990 
Burkina Faso 1978 
Cambodia 1993 
Cent. African Rep. 1993 
Chile 1989 
Comoros 1975 
Comoros 1990 
Comoros 2002 
Congo Brazzaville 1960 
Congo Brazzaville 1992 
Croatia 2000 
Czech Republic 1993 
Djibouti 1999 
Dominican Rep 1962 
Dominican Rep 1978 
East Timor 2002 
Ecuador 1968 
Ecuador 1979 
El Salvador 1984 
Estonia 1991 
Ethiopia 1995 
Fiji 1970 
Fiji 1990 
Gambia 1965 
Georgia 1991 
Ghana 1970 
Ghana 1979 
Greece 1975 
Guatemala 1966 
Guatemala 1986 
Guinea-Bissau 1994 
Guyana 1966 
Guyana 1992 
Haiti 1990 
Haiti 1994 
Honduras 1982 
Hungary 1990 
Indonesia 1999 
Iran 1997 
Ivory Coast 2000 
Kenya 1963 
Kenya 2002 
Korea South 1960 
Korea South 1963 
Korea South 1988 
Latvia 1991 
Lesotho 1966 
Lesotho 1993 
Lithuania 1991 
Macedonia 1991 
Madagascar 1992 
Malawi 1994 
Mali 1992 
Mauritius 1968 
Mexico 1997 
Moldova 1991 
Mongolia 1992 
Mozambique 1994 
Namibia 1990 
Nepal 1990 
Nicaragua 1990 
Niger 1992 
Niger 1999 
Nigeria 1960 
Nigeria 1979 
Nigeria 1999 
Pakistan 1962 
Pakistan 1973 
Pakistan 1988 
Panama 1989 
Paraguay 1989 
Peru 1980 
Peru 2001 
Philippines 1987 
Poland 1991 
Portugal 1976 
Romania 1990 
Senegal 2000 
Sierra Leone 1961 
Sierra Leone 1968 
Sierra Leone 1996 
Slovakia 1993 
Slovenia 1991 
Somalia 1960 
Spain 1978 
Sudan 1965 
Taiwan 1992 
Thailand 1969 
Thailand 1974 
Thailand 1978 
Thailand 1992 
Turkey 1973 
Turkey 1983 
Uganda 1962 
Uganda 1980 
Ukraine 1991 
Uruguay 1985 
Yugoslavia 2000 
Zambia 1964 
Zambia 1991 
Zimbabwe 1970 
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